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Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena 
Power, and Judicial Review: Three Branches, 
Three Powers, and Some Relationships 
Rex E. Lee* 
In United States v. Nixon, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized the existence of the President's right under appropri- 
ate circumstances to withhold certain kinds of information from 
coordinate branches of government.* The Court held that this 
right, which bears the label executive privilege, is based on sepa- 
ration of powers. One year later, in Eastland u. United States 
Servicemen's Fund,3 the Court held that the issuance and en- 
forcement of congressional subpoenas are protected under the 
speech or debate ~ l a u s e . ~  
A case now pending before the United States Court of Ap- 
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, United States v. Amer- 
ican Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T),5 raises additional im- 
portant issues concerning executive privilege, congressional in- 
vestigative power, and the broader separation of powers context 
out of which these issues arise. Described by the court of appeals 
as presenting "nerve-center constitutional q~est ions,"~ the case 
brings squarely into confrontation for the first time in history 
three potent prerogatives of our three branches of government: 
* Dean and Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer- 
sity. B.A., 1960, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1963, University of Chicago. Assistant 
United States Attorney General, May 1975-January 1977. Dean Lee was personally in- 
volved in the AT&T case, and argued the case before the district court and the court of 
appeals. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Department 
of Justice during the Ford administration. 
The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Allen D. Butler, a recent gradu- 
ate of the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
1. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
2. Id. at 706-07. In Nixon the Court held that, under the circumstances of the case, 
the President was obligated to comply with a judicial subpoena, because the President 
raised only generalized claims of confidentiality, as contrasted with the judiciary's specific 
need for the information in a criminal proceeding. While congressional subpoenas were 
not directly involved in Nixon, the fair inference to be drawn from the opinion is that 
executive privilege has applicability to attetnpts by either Congress or the courts to obtain 
information. 
3. 421 U.S. 491 (1975). 
4. See notes 43-58 and accompanying text infra. 
5. The court of appeals has issued two opinions in the case. The first is reported a t  
551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976); and the second, at 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
6. 551 F.2d at 394. 
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Congress' investigatory (subpoena) power, executive privilege 
exercised to protect foreign intelligence secrets, and judicial re- 
view. 
Section I of this Article briefly examines that AT&T case. 
Subsequent sections will explore some of the issues that it raises. 
Section II will discuss the applicability of the speech or debate 
clause to congressional investigations and the scope of executive 
privilege when the information a t  issue is not in the government's 
possession. Secton III will explore the possible procedural ave- 
nues by which an executive privilege-congressional subpoena con- 
frontation might arise, including the constitutional impediments 
to bringing such confrontations before the courts. Section IV 
deals with the constitutional authority of the courts to resolve 
these conflicts, and Section V examines the possible standards 
appropriate for their resolution. 
A. History of the Controversy 
For several decades, the United States has engaged in war- 
rantless electronic surveillance (wiretapping) to protect national 
security interests.' Such surveillance is initiated only after ap- 
7. There is no authorizing statute for such surveillance. Its assumed legal basis is an 
inherent power in the President derived from his responsibilities as Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces, his responsibilities in the area of foreign relations, and his duty under 
article 11, § 1 of the Constitution to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States." The Supreme Court held in United States v. United States District Court 
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), that  the President lacks such power at least insofar as 
domestic threats to national security are concerned. The Keith opinion left open the issue 
of inherent Presidential power to protect national security from foreign threats, including 
foreign powers, foreign agents, and agents of foreign powers. Id. at 308, 321-22. See also 
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (held illegal a warrantless surveillance 
imposed on the Jewish Defense League whose activities were directed against foreign 
powers, but which is not itself a foreign power). 
Further detail on the procedures involved in instituting such a surveillance is con- 
tained in United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454,456 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion). 
The lack of statutory authority for these foreign intelligence surveillances has been a 
source of concern for the Attorney General. To alleviate this problem, S. 3197,94th Cong., 
2d Sess., was proposed in 1976 with the support of the Ford administration, particularly 
Attorney General Levi. The bill was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Commit- 
tee and by the Senate Committee on Intelligence, but died in the Senate at the close of 
the 94th Congress. Currently, the Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978, S. 1566, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess., has been reported favorably by the same committees that reported S. 3197 during 
the 94th Congress. S. REP. NO. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1978). 
S. 3197 recognized the possible existence of inherent Presidential authority, in addi- 
tion to that authorized by the bill. The current bill, by contrast, specifies that its provi- 
sions constitute the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance as defined . . . may 
be conducted." S. 1566, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 2511(2) (1978). 
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proval by the Attorney General, and is effected by the govern- 
ment leasing a telephone line which runs from the telephone of 
the surveillance target to an FBI monitoring station. Prior to 
1969, the arrangements for these leased lines were handled 
  rally.^ Since then, however, all leased line arrangements have 
been memorialized by a "leased line letter," sometimes called a 
"national security request letter." This is a single-paragraph form 
letter identifying the points "from" and "to" which service is to 
be leased. It states that the service is to effect a foreign intelli- 
gence surveillance authorized in writing by the Attorney General, 
and cautions that the existence of the letter should not be dis- 
closed lest the investigation be impeded.' These leased line letters 
have never been classified. The persons who handle them within 
the AT&T affiliate companies are all AT&T employees who have 
not undergone any formal governmental clearance procedure. 
The security afforded the letters has been described, however, as 
8. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d a t  388 n.5. 
9. The leased line letter form is as follows: 
Date 
Addressee 
Dear Mr. 
In connection with an investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, under its lawful and established jurisdiction, it is requested 
that you furnish to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a t  the usual commercial 
rates, the facilities or services set out below. This request is made upon the 
specific written authorization of the Attorney General of the United States as a 
necessary investigative technique under the powers of the President to protect 
the national security against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a 
foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the 
security of the United States, or to protect national security information against 
foreign intelligence activities, in connection with an investigation of organiza- 
tions or individuals suspected to be agents of or acting in collaboration with a 
foreign power. Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated. 
It is requested that private line facilities be furnished as follows: 
From: 
To: 
You are not to disclose the existence of this request. Any such disclosure 
could obstruct and impede the investigation. 
Very truly yours, 
Clarence M. Kelley, 
Director 
Joint Appendix a t  48, United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opin- 
ion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appen- 
dix]. 
The "from" portion of the form is followed by information identifying the surveillance 
target by telephone number, address, telephone pole or line number, or other more techni- 
cal information from which the telephone company can identify the telephone to be 
tapped. 
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involving "the strictest security safeguards."1° 
On June 22, 1976, pursuant to its investigation into possible 
governmental abuse of section 605 of the Communications Act,ll 
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce is- 
sued a subpoena directing AT&T to deliver to that committee's 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations four categories of 
documents.12 The first category consisted of the leased line letters 
10. Id. at 44. AT&T security safeguards were described by Robert L. Keuch, deputy 
assistant to the Attorney General, as follows: 
Upon information and belief AT&T receives and maintains all leased line 
letters under the strictest security safeguards. In the normal case not more than 
one individual per company is authorized to receive and have access to the 
request letter. In all cases the leased line letters are maintained within the 
security section of the corporation. Under company policies, members of 
AT&T's security organization are employed only after a full field investigation 
of the general nature utilized by the FBI in processing security clearances. 
Finally, all leased line letters are separately maintained in safes or secure com- 
partments as would be required for classified information held by the Executive 
Branch. In all the years in which AT&T has performed this function, there is 
no evidence that the security of the leased line evidence has ever been compro- 
mised. 
Id. 
11. 47 U.S.C. 5 605 (1970). Section 605 protects the privacy of radio or wire communi- 
cations by prohibiting the interception of such communications or the divulgence of the 
contents of such communications. Id. The dual purpose of the investigation, as described 
by Congressman Moss, was "to determine whether existing law, specifically section 605 
of the Communications Act, is being abused by the Executive Branch" and "the possible 
need for corrective legislation . . . relating to the protection and interception of private, 
interstate communications." Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 193. 
Certain activities by the President are excepted from 6 605: 
Nothing . . . in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 
1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take 
such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or 
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelli- 
gence information deemed essential to the security information against foreign 
intelligence activities. 
18 U.S.C. 5 2511(3) (1970). 
12. The four categories were: 
1. Full and complete copies of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) na- 
tional security request letters, in the possession or control of American Tele- 
phone and Telegraph (AT&T) and its 24 operating companies listed below, for 
access to phone lines handling either verbal or non-verbal communications. 
2. Copies of any and all records in the possession or control of AT&T or its 
operating companies prior to 1969 when written FBI requests were not routinely 
requested by AT&T and its operating companies. 
3. Copies of any and all applicable Bell System Practices (BSP's) describing 
company policy regarding national security "taps" or "provision of facilities" 
to law enforcement or intelligence agencies. This should include both current 
BSP's and any BSP's on the subject which have since been revised or discontin- 
ued. 
4. Copies of internal memoranda, correspondence, board minutes, or other 
records relative to AT&T, and/or any AT&T operating company, practice or 
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in the possession of AT&T and its affiliates. The White House 
responded to the AT&T subpoena by attempting to negotiate a 
compromise with the subcommittee. The principal focus of the 
negotiation efforts was to substitute copies of memoranda pre- 
pared by the FBI for the leased line letters. These memoranda 
describe the facts and circumstances relevant to the requested 
surveillance, and provide the basic information considered by the 
Attorney General in making his decision. 
The general concept of such a substitution served the inter- 
ests of both sides. One of the principal concerns underlying the 
congressional investigation was whether the wiretaps had been 
restricted to foreign intelligence matters or activities or whether 
some of the taps had been used for domestic purposes. The letters 
themselves contained no information concerning the background 
or activities of the person whose telephone had been tapped or 
why those activities qualified him-or failed to qualify him-as 
a legitimate foreign intelligence surveillance target.13 By contrast, 
the backup memoranda would reveal to the subcommittee the 
circumstances and considerations that justified the surveillance. 
The executive branch also preferred to release the memoranda 
(with certain deletions to prevent identification of the specific 
targets) rather than the letters themselves. Release of the letters 
would increase the number of people having access to information 
that could identify every foreign intelligence target under United 
States surveillance since 1969. 
Through a series of negotiations lasting nearly a month, 
agreement was reached on some, but not all points. It was agreed 
that AT&T would provide to the subcommittee, and the subcom- 
mittee in turn would provide to the FBI, a list of the dates of the 
leased line letters. From these dates, the FBI would identify the 
letters that pertained exclusively to domestic  surveillance^,^^ and 
the backup memoranda pertaining to domestic surveillances 
would be supplied with only such minor deletions as were neces- 
policy with respect to national security "taps" or "provision of facilities" to law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies, covering the last 10 years. 
United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454, 455-56 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion). 
13. It would be theoretically possible, of course, for the subcommittee to conduct its 
own investigation to determine whether a tap on a particular telephone was for legitimate 
foreign intelligence, but there is no suggestion that the subcommittee proposed, or felt 
itself gualified, to carry out that kind of highly secret and sensitive investigation. 
14. Leased line letters in this category would be limited to those that occurred be- 
tween 1969, when the leased line letter procedure began, and June 19, 1972, the date of 
the Keith decision. See note 7 supra. 
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sary to shield particularly sensitive ongoing investigations. With 
regard to foreign intelligence surveillances, the subcommittee 
would select a random sample of the backup memoranda for two 
selected years, 1972 and 1975. The FBI would make copies of 
these sample memoranda, substituting generic classifications or 
descriptions15 for any information that might identify targets or 
sources. The subcommittee would then have access to the edited 
memoranda at the FBI. 
The irreconcilable point of difference was the subcommit- 
tee's view that in order to verify the integrity of the expurgating 
process, the subcommittee would need to compare a subsample 
of the edited backup memoranda with unexpurgated originals. 
The subcommittee proposed that three representatives be 
allowed to compare the original and edited memoranda at  the 
FBI, and that they be permitted to take their notes back to the 
subcommittee. The executive branch opposed this plan princi- 
pally because the notes, if allowed to leave the FBI, would be- 
come subcommittee records, subject to examination by any 
House member under House Rule XI 8 2(e)(2) .I6 
On July 22, after nearly a month of negotiations and one day 
prior to the July 23 subpoena compliance date, the executive 
branch filed suit against AT&T to obtain a temporary restraining 
order." At the temporary restraining order hearing, Congressman 
John Moss, chairman of the subcommittee, presented a motion 
to intervene which the court granted. After argument, the court 
issued an order restraining AT&T from releasing the letters. 
15. For example, the term "Middle East Diplomat" might be substituted for the 
target's name. 
16. Rule XI 8 2(e)(2) provides: "All committee hearings, records, data, charts, and 
files shall be kept separate and distinct from the congressional office records of the mem- 
ber serving as chairman of the committee; and such records shall be the property of the 
House and all Members of the House shall have access thereto." W. BROWN, MANUAL AND 
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 420 
(1975). 
17. At the same time, the President sent a letter to Congressman Staggers, chairman 
of the full Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, who had signed the subpoena. 
The letter constituted an invocation of executive privilege. It advised the chairman: 
I have determined that compliance with the subpoena would involve unaccept- 
able risks of disclosure of extremely sensitive foreign intelligence and counterin- 
telligence information and would be detrimental to the national defense and 
foreign policy of the United States and damaging to the national security. Com- 
pliance with the Committee's subpoena would, therefore, be contrary to the 
public interest. 
United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454,458 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion) (quoting letter from 
Gerald R. Ford to Harley 0. Staggers (July 22, 1976)). 
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Eight days later the district court rendered final judgment for the 
executive branch. l8 
The court observed that the case involved an assertion of 
executive privilege having an effect on Congress' powers of speech 
or debate under Eastland v.  United States Servicemen's Fund,19 
but rejected the position taken by Congressman Moss that the 
legislative authority to investigate is absolute. In the district 
court's view, "the power of one coordinate branch of government 
must be balanced against that of the other. Neither can be con- 
sidered in a vacuum."20 The district court concluded not only that 
"[tlhe helpfulness of the national security request letters in de- 
termining the basis on which the wire taps were instituted is 
minimal," but also that "the President has determined that re- 
lease of the material would present an unacceptable risk of disclo- 
sure of the most sensitive national security and foreign policy 
matters." Because "[sluch a determination by the Executive is 
generally accorded great deference by the courts, "11 judgment was 
rendered for the executive and a permanent injunction issued. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuitn 
took a different approach. After holding that there was federal 
jurisdiction to consider the case under 28 U.S.C. Q 1331," the 
court held that it need not decide whether the case was moot,24 
whether it presented a nonjusticiable political question,z5 or how 
it should resolve the "patently conflicting assertions of absolute 
a~thority."~~ollowing its earlier precedent in Nixon v. Sirica, * 
18. United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion). 
19. 421 U.S. 491 (1975). 
20. 419 F. Supp. at 459. 
21. Id. at 460. 
22. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 
121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion). 
23. Section 1331 grants jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States, wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 
U.S.C. 5 1331(a) (1970). The court found a federal question in the executive's claim that 
"its constitutional powers with respect to national security and foreign affairs included 
the right to prevent transmission of the request letters to Congress." 551 F.2d at 389. The 
$10,000 requirement was satisfied by the court's conclusion that "far more than $10,000 
would be required to repair [the] damage" which would result from disclosure, such as 
"disruption of diplomatic relations and of our intelligence and counterintelligence pro- 
grams, including possible danger to the lives of counterintelligence sources." Id. 
24. 551 F.2d at 390. The subpoena would have expired with the adjournment of the 
House, since the House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuing body. Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 512 (1975). 
25. 551 F.2d at 390-91. The court did face this issue in its second opinion. See notes 
126-29 and accompanying text infra. 
26. 551 F.2d at 391-92. 
27. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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the court held that issues of such magnitude involving the consti- 
tutional powers of its sister branches should not be judicially re- 
solved until every opportunity for a negotiated settlement had 
been exhausted, especially since (at least in the court's view) the 
parties had already come so close to reaching a settlement." 
While observing that "[ilt would be the function of the parties 
to propose the structure and its details," the court suggested in 
some detail how the parties might proceed.2Q The court of appeals 
ordered the district court "to report to us concerning the progress 
of these negotiations within three months of the date of this opin- 
ion, unless the executive and congressional parties jointly ask for 
an extension or report an earlier impasse."30 
Negotiations pursuant to the court of appeals' first opinion 
and order extended over a period of two months, culminating in 
a final offer by the Justice Department closely approximating the 
suggestions contained in the court of appeals' opinion. The sub- 
committee found this proposal unacceptable. 
When the case came back before the court of appeals for the 
second time,31 that court held the controversy justiciable and re- 
jected the claims of both parties that their respective substantive 
positions were entitled to absolute constitutional protection. The 
court declined, however, to render a final judgment in favor of 
either side. Adhering to the fundamental premise of its earlier 
opinion that, to the maximum extent possible, the conflict should 
be resolved by negotiation between the article I and article I1 
branches rather than by decree from the article 111 branch, the 
court elected "to continue our approach of grad~al ism."~~ The
court ordered that the parties experiment with the following pro- 
cedure: Members of the subcommittee staff would be allowed to 
examine a sample of ten unexpurgated memoranda, and would 
be allowed to take notes. The notes, however, would remain under 
28. "There was almost a settlement in 1976. It  may well be attainable in 1977." 551 
F.2d at 394. Earlier the court had observed: "It is an additional, if fortuitous, advantage 
that under ow decision, negotiations can be conducted not only by a new House but by a 
new President." Id. at  390. 
29. Id. at 395 n.18. The suggestion of the court was that a small number of congres- 
sional staff investigators be given access to a subsample of the unexpurgated backup 
memoranda. The President would be allowed to certify the investigators' security clear- 
ance, and the investigators' notes would be held under seal and not revealed unless there 
was a claim that there were discrepancies between the original and edited memoranda. 
That claim would be submitted to the district court, which would base-jts decision on an 
in camera comparison of both sets of memoranda and the investigators' sealed notes. 
30. Id. at  395. 
31. 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
32. Id. at  131. 
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seal with the FBI. If inaccuracies were found, the subcommittee 
could take its claim to the district court, where the memoranda 
would be examined in camera. The executive would be allowed 
to make substitutions, but only upon an in camera showing that 
the memoranda were accurately edited and that the contents 
were extraordinarily sensitive. While this procedure was being 
carried out, the subcommittee was to have access to all memo- 
randa for the sample years (1972 and 1975) in edited form.33 
Thus, on the delicate and difficult ultimate issue in the 
case-accommodating the competing constitutional needs of two 
sister branches, and declaring a winner-commonsense practical- 
ity once again prevailed over traditional judicial form. In its sec- 
ond opinion as in its first, the court of appeals used the power and 
authority of the federal judiciary not to settle the dispute between 
the other two branches, but rather to intensify the incentive and 
the pressure on these branches to settle the dispute themselves. 
The theoretical and practical strengths of this approach are dis- 
cussed in Section III, Subsection C of this Article. 
B. Implications of the Controversy 
The court of appeals in its first opinion expressed the view 
that "[tlhe negotiations came close to success."34 In one sense 
this is a correct statement. The information a t  issue-targets and 
sources contained in a subsample of original memoranda- 
constituted only a very small portion of the total information in 
the memoranda, viewed either from the standpoint of word count 
or substantive content. 
From another vantage point, however, the disagreement over 
verification represented nothing less than a head-on conflict be- 
tween the fundamental authority and responsibility of the article 
I and article I1 branches: congressional powers of investigation 
versus Presidential responsibility for preservation of foreign in- 
telligence secrets. Chairman Moss insisted that the subcommit- 
tee's rights of investigation, as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
in Eastland, were absolute and that the subcommittee could not 
discharge its responsibility without verifying, a t  least on a sample 
basis, (1) that there were in fact original memoranda from which 
the expurgated copies had been made, and (2) the accuracy of 
the generic substitutes. The President, on the other hand, relied 
33. Id. at 131-32. 
34. 551 F.2d at 386. 
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upon United States v. Nixon" to his assertion that it was the ex- 
ecutive's prerogative to decide whether sensitive intelligence in- 
formation should be disclosed. From the executive's viewpoint, 
the proposed verification process raised the same concerns as did 
access to the leased line letters: identification of foreign intelli- 
gence surveillance targets. Though the problem was susceptible 
to resolution through negotiation, neither was willing to trust the 
other. Chairman Moss would not accept the President's assur- 
ance that no domestic surveillances were involved, and the Presi- 
dent was unwilling to run the risk that out of 435 members of 
Congress having access to the information, not one would disclose 
it.36 Thus, each side was in the unaccustomed position of having 
one of its constitutional responsibilities in a face-off with an 
equally clear constitutional responsibility of another branch. Ac- 
cordingly, the prerequisite to a negotiated settlement was a con- 
cession by one branch of part of its constitutional authority to the 
corresponding benefit of the other branch.37 
During the negotiations the dispute had centered around the 
allocation of authority between two branches of government. But 
once the suit was filed, the conflict expanded to embrace the 
authority of the article I11 branch as well. In the initial district 
court proceedings, counsel for Chairman Moss took the position 
that the court's restraining order would have no effect on Con- 
gress and that article I gave Congress exclusive jurisdiction over 
all aspects of the matter.38 On the day following the temporary 
35. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
36. The court of appeals observed that such release could be forbidden either by the 
subcommittee, the committee, or the full House. 551 F.2d a t  386. Any individual member 
of Congress, however, may publicize even the most sensitive information, and so long as 
he does so within the scope of congressional activity covered by the speech or debate 
clause-such as floor debate or committee hearings-that clause immunizes him from any 
civil or criminal consequences from such publication. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 
606 (1972). 
37. An objective examiner of the record in United States v. AT&T might conclude 
that just such a concession was in fact made by the President and rejected by Chairman 
Moss. There was an offer to permit the chairman himself to compare the expurgated 
copies with the original documents from which they were copied. Joint Appendix, supra 
note 9, a t  145-48. This might be viewed as effectively resolving the standoff in favor of 
the legislative branch. Nevertheless, the chairman rejected this offer. In his view the 
subcommittee had a right of access to the information, and the expurgated-copy-with- 
verification procedure was itself a compromise. Particularly significant in the chairman's 
view was the fact that "[wle have been advised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
that a t  least 14 Executive Branch officials and staff have routine access to these docu- 
ments, and an unknown number of additional staff have access on a 'need-to-know' basis." 
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 148 (letter from Chairman Moss to Assistant Attorney 
General Rex E. Lee). 
38. At the outset of his argument a t  the temporary restraining order hearing, counsel 
for the subcommittee stated: "The issue is, I don't think your Honor with due respect, 
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restraining order hearing, however, the subcommittee elected not 
to enforce its subpoena and thus avoided placing AT&T in the 
difficult position of having to choose between being held in con- 
tempt of court or contempt of C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~  
United States v. AT&T marks the second time in history 
that a case involving an assertion of executive privilege against a 
congressional subpoena has reached the federal court of appeals 
level." I t  is the first such case where the purpose of the executive 
privilege assertion was to protect foreign intelligence secrets. In 
light of the holding in United States v. Nixon4l that executive 
with all due respect to Your Honor and to the Court, I don't think you have jurisdiction 
to block Article I of the Constitution where we have, where the Subcommittee has clear 
jurisdiction." Transcript of Oral Argument, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order a t  
20, United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion). 
The following colloquy occurred a t  the time the district court judge indicated that 
he would grant a temporary restraining order: 
THE COURT: 
MR. LEMOV: 
THE COURT: 
MR. LEMOV: 
THE COURT: 
ents. 
MR. LEMOV: 
not- 
THE COURT: 
it? 
MR. LEMOV: 
THE COURT: 
MR. LEMOV: 
I am going to grant a TRO. 
That won't affect the Congress. 
All Right. 
I am sorry, Your Honor. 
All right. I am glad to  know the position of your constitu- 
Our position is that Article One is self sufficient and it is 
In other words, you are going to flaunt the TRO, is that 
I would not say we are going to flaunt the TRO. I t  is- 
Well, what did you say? 
I would say that the TRO would not bind the Congress in 
the exercise of its legislative powers, but I would refer that matter to our Sub- 
committee. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LEMOV: To make that decision. 
Id. at  29. 
39. The occasion was a subcommittee hearing held a t  the appointed time for compli- 
ance with the subpoena, Friday, July 23. The witnesses a t  the hearing were AT&T offi- 
cials. Chairman Moss reiterated the view stated the evening before by his counsel that 
the courts had no authority to enjoin compliance with a properly issued congressional 
subpoena. Nevertheless, he announced that he would not precipitate the issue by holding 
AT&T officials in contempt of Congress: 
MR. MOSS: Well, the Chair recognizes the very difficult position Ameri- 
can Telephone and Telegraph is placed in because of the actions of the court, 
which were taken late yesterday afternoon. 
While the Subcommittee or the Chairman, does not recognize that the court 
has a lawful authority to interfere with this committee, it recognizes that to 
pursue this matter at this moment would place AT&T between the very difficult 
choices of being in contempt of the House or in contempt of the court. 
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, a t  95. 
40. The first was Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 90-105 infra. 
41. 418 U S .  683 (1974). 
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privilege is constitutionally based, and the holding in Eastland 
v. United States Servicemen's Fund" one year later that at  least 
some aspects of the issuance and enforcement of congressional 
subpoenas are included within the speech or debate immunity, 
issues raised by the confrontation between these two constitution- 
ally based prerogatives are likely to be increasingly important in 
the future. In AT&T, and potentially in future cases, the scope 
of these competing congressional and executive prerogatives has 
an important bearing on the conflict between them. Two issues 
involved with the scope of these prerogatives are discussed in 
Section 11. 
The final issue with which this Article will deal concerns the 
standards by which federal courts should resolve conflicts be- 
tween Congress' investigative powers and a Presidential assertion 
of executive privilege." Before such standards can be delineated, 
however, the scope of the two competing powers and the constitu- 
tional anchorage of each must be explored. Accordingly, this Sec- 
tion will examine two problems. The first concerns the scope of 
the speech or debate clause as it relates to congressional investi- 
gations. The second involves the scope of the executive privilege 
doctrine when the information is in the hands of a private third 
party. 
A. Speech or Debate and Congressional Investigations 
Congress' investigative powers are not expressly authorized 
by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has long recognized, 
however, that they are so essential to the legislative function as 
to be implied by the general vesting of legislative power in Con- 
gress." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund contains 
42. 421 U.S. 491 (1975). 
43. Section V infra. 
44. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 
U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927). The investigatory powers are not unlimited, however, and may 
be employed only "in aid of the legislative function." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 
168, 189 (1881). In addition, a congressional committee must show that it  has been author- 
ized to make the investigation and that the information sought is pertinent. Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U.S. at 201, 208-09. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 
(1959) (giving a much more liberal interpretation of the authorization requirement). 
The protection afforded by the speech or debate clause has similar limitations in that 
it protects only those activities which fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,376 (1951). See Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S. 
306 (1973) (clause did not bar suit against person who, with authorization from Congress, 
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arguable bases for an inference that the speech or debate clause, 
where applicable, affords an even larger measure of support for 
congressional investigative activity than are implied by Congress' 
general investigative powers.45 
The speech or debate clause appears in the first paragraph 
of article I, section 6 of the Constitution. That paragraph pro- 
vides: 
The Senators and Representatives Shall receive a Compensa- 
tion for their services, to be ascertained by Law, and Paid out 
of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, 
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged 
from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their re- 
spective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; 
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place. 
Both the context and also the language of the speech or debate 
clause imply that its fundamental purpose is to prevent the kind 
of interference with the discharge of congressional responsibilities 
that would result from Senators and Representatives being invol- 
untarily involved in legal proceedings while Congress is in ses- 
sion." The thrust of the clause is to protect members of the Con- 
gress (or their aides) from arrest or litigation as defendants. This 
distributed allegedly injurious materials to the public rather than limiting distribution 
solely to legislative activities); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (clause would 
bar questioning of congressional aide, but would not preclude an inquiry into alleged 
arrangements for the private publication of the Pentagon Papers); United States v. Brew- 
ster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (clause did not bar prosecution for acceptance of a bribe). 
45. One of these inferential bases is provided by Justice Marshall's concurring opin- 
ion, analyzed in this Section. Another is the Court's distinction of its earlier holdings in 
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109 (1959). See note 51 infra. A third is the bare fact that the Court decided the case under 
the speech or debate clause. Whether speech or debate extends to congressional investiga- 
tive activities other than the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas, and whether those 
components of congressional investigations that are included within speech or debate 
(assuming there is a difference) enjoy greater constitutional protection, are questions 
outside the reach of this Article. For reasons discussed in Section V, the controlling 
consideration for present purposes is the fact that Congress' investigative powers which 
come into confrontation with assertions of executive privilege are constitutionally based. 
46. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969). See also Dombrowski v. East- 
land, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (same 
immunity accorded state legislators); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 82, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 117-20 (1973). For a detailed history of the speech or debate clause, see Reinstein & 
Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HAW. L. REV. 1113 
(1973). For a complete discussion of all Supreme Court decisions regarding the clause, see 
Suarez, Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Existing Distinctions and a Proposal for 
a New Definitional Approach, 20 VILL. L. REV. 97 (1974). 
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is the only application of speech or debate that has ever been 
made by Supreme Court holdings. 
In Eastland the Court held that the speech or debate clause 
precluded a federal court from enjoining the issuance of a con- 
gressional subpoena duces tecum directing a bank to produce 
records of an organization, notwithstanding the Court's apparent 
acceptance of the argument that the disclosure of such records 
would infringe upon the plaintiff's first amendment rights of asso- 
~ia t ion.~ '  An issue left unresolved by Eastland is whether speech 
or debate protection is applicable in those cases where no congres- 
sional person or entity is named as a defendant. Alternatively 
stated, the issue is whether speech or debate creates only an 
immunity from suit for Congressmen and their aides, or whether 
it constitutes a positive constitutional guarantee that can be as- 
serted either defensively or affirmatively. The issue is present in 
cases involving a n  assertion of executive privilege where the exec- 
utive branch can simply refuse to disclose information in its pos- 
session, thus forcing Congress to go to court as a plaintiff to 
enforce its subpoena. The issue also arises in the AT&T situation 
since the executive branch can achieve its nondisclosure objective 
through a judicial decree that runs only to noncongressional par- 
ties to the litigation, thus forcing Congress into the role of inter- 
venor. 
Although the issue was not raised in Eastland, some support 
can be found in that case for the proposition that speech or debate 
protects all congressional investigations from judicial interfer- 
e n ~ e . ~ ~  Rather than resting the decision upon the simple fact that 
47. Eastland involved a subpoena issued by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal 
Security. The subcommittee was investigating the activities of the United States Service- 
men's Fund (USSF) and, pursuant to that investigation, issued a subpoena to the bank 
where USSF had an account, commanding the bank to produce " 'any records appertain- 
ing to or involving the account or accounts of [USSF].' " 421 U.S. at 494. USSF and its 
members brought suit to enjoin implementation of the subpoena. Named as defendants 
were Subcommittee Chairman Eastland, nine other Senators, the subcommittee's chief 
counsel, and the bank. Id. at  495. The bank did not participate in the action. Id. at 495 
n.5. 
48. The issue would have been raised in Eastland if the suit had been pursued exclu- 
sively against the bank. (Although the bank was named as a defendant, it did not partici- 
pate in the action-apparently because it was never served. Id. at 494-95 nn.4 & 5.) 
Although the majority opinion does not deal with the issue, the theoretical complications 
from the presence of the bank-a nongovernmental entity-as a defendant in the case 
were the focus of some concern at  the oral argument. During the rebuttal argument, the 
Court persisted in questioning Mr. Miller, attorney for the subcommittee and Senator 
Eastland, concerning the nonavailability of the speech or debate immunity to the bank, 
until it finally extracted from him the following concession: 
MR. MILLER: The Court of Appeals decision authorizes a judgment 
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the decree in that case ran only to Senators and their aides, the 
Court emphasized the disruption and delay of the legislative pro- 
cess occasioned by judicial review. At one point the Court stated: 
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interfer- 
ence may cause. A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for 
nearly five years, during which the Members and their aide 
have been obliged to devote time to consultation with their 
counsel concerning the litigation, and have been distracted 
from the purpose of their inquiry. The Clause was written to 
prevent the need to he confronted by such "questioning" and 
to forbid invocation of judicial power to challenge the wisdom 
of Congress' use of its investigative a~thority.~@ 
Also instructive is the Court's approach to the issue in 
Eastland. As the Court framed the issue, "[tlhe question to be 
resolved is whether the actions of [Congress] fall within the 
'sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' If they do, [Congress] 
'shall not be questioned in any other Place' about those activities 
since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause are abso- 
lute . . . ."50 The significance of these two sentences, is of course, 
their confinement of the relevant issues in the case to the scope 
of the speech or debate clause. The Court found that the power 
to investigate and the subpoena power plainly fell within the 
"legitimate legislative sphere" protected by speech or debate. 
Having found that, the Court refused to balance the speech or 
debate interests against the plain tiff's countervailing first 
amendment claim.51 
against the Senators. And if I say so myself, i t  would be the only time, to my 
knowledge, that any such type- 
QUESTION: But if we should reverse that, Mr. Miller, there will still be, 
in this lawsuit, something that involves the banks? 
MR. MILLER: The banks are, as I understand it, are still defendants, 
and- 
QUESTION: So even if you win, this lawsuit is not completely over? 
MR. MILLER: I assume that they could still proceed against the banks, 
to-the banks are defendants unless- 
QUESTION: And if they do in that circumstance, your victory on the 
Speech or Debate Clause will not assist the banks any, in their defense of the 
lawsuit. 
MR. MILLER: I would think not, Your Honor. I would think not. 
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, a t  68-68a. 
49. 421 U.S. a t  511 (footnote omitted). 
50. Id. a t  501 (footnote omitted). 
51. The Court recognized that in two earlier opinions, Watkins v. United States, 354 
U.S. 178, 198 (1957), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959), first 
amendment rights had been balanced against congressional investigatory power. Those 
cases were distinguishable, however, because they were criminal prosecutions, wherein the 
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On the other hand, Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in 
Eastland (joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart) contains lan- 
guage that  appears squarely supportive of the view that the 
speech or debate clause provides immunity only in suits against 
Congressmen or their aides. The following excerpts are illustra- 
tive: 
As our cases have consistently held, . . . the Speech or Debate 
Clause protects legislators and their confidential aides from 
suit; it does not immunize congressional action from judicial 
review.52 
[ y h e  protection of the Speech or Debate Clause is personal. 
It extends to Members and their counsel acting in a legislative 
capacity; it does not preclude judicial review of their decisions 
in an appropriate case, whether they take the form of legislation 
or a subpoena.53 
Our prior cases arising under the Speech or Debate Clause indi- 
cate that only a Member of Congress or his aide may not be 
called upon to defend a subpoena against constitutional objec- 
tion, and not that the objection will not be heard at  
The language cited above, taken either alone or in context,55 
defendants asserted their first amendment rights to justify their refusals to answer con- 
gressional inquiries, and thus Congress had sought the aid of the judiciary in enforcing 
its will. Eastland, on the other hand, was "an attempt to interfere with an ongoing activity 
by Congress, and that activity is . . . within the legitimate legislative sphere"; thus 
balancing would not be applied. 421 U.S. a t  509 n.16. Another commentator suggests that 
the import of Eastland "is not simply that particular defendants were immune from suit, 
but rather that pre-enforcement review of a congressional subpoena may not be available 
at  all.'' The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 136 (1975) (footnote omit- 
ted). 
52. 421 U.S. at 513 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
53. Id. a t  515. 
54. Id. a t  516. 
There may be another explanation for the apparent neatness with which these and 
other excerpts from Justice Marshall's concurrence fit the argument that the speech or 
debate immunity applies only where Congressmen or their aides are the actual defen- 
dants. The peculiar problem in Eastland was that the persons whose first amendment 
rights were allegedly threatened did not have custody over the documents whose disclosure 
would constitute the alleged invasion of first amendment interests. As a consequence, the 
usual procedure for challenging a subpoena on constitutional grounds-refusal to comply 
followed by litigation of the legal issues in the enforcement proceeding-was not available 
to the United States Servicemen's Fund, "since a neutral third party could not be ex- 
pected to resist the subpoena by placing itself in contempt." Id. a t  514. Thus, it may be 
that the purpose of Justice Marshall's concurrence in Eastland was simply to emphasize 
that, notwithstanding the absolute nature of the speech or debate guarantee, it  was proper 
for the district court to entertain the suit brought by the servicemen's fund. Because the 
fund was not subject to the subpoena it could not assert its constitutional interests in the 
customary way, by resisting compliance. 
55. Particularly if that context includes the concession extracted from counsel for the 
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implies that at least three members of the United States Supreme 
Court have concluded that the speech or debate clause provides 
only immunity from suit to Congressmen and their aides. While 
Justice Marshall's opinion stops short of an assertion that the 
speech or debate clause would be unavailing in a suit where the 
only relief sought was an injunction against a private party, that 
is its necessary import. The opinion recognizes and approves the 
absolute nature of the speech or debate guarantee which, where 
applicable, puts an end to judicial inquiry. It also approves the 
district court's entertaining the suit under the peculiar proce- 
dural posture of that case. But both of these propositions were 
also recognized by the majority, and Mr. Justice Marshall's con- 
currence appears to be written for the principal purpose of ex- 
pressing a view on an issue that is not covered by the majority 
opinion. 
The issue whether the speech or debate clause guprantees 
only an immunity for members of Congress and their aides when 
they are joined as defendants in litigation, or whether it consti- 
tutes an affirmative grant of power, was raised in United States 
v. AT&T because the documents at issue were in the possession 
of a private party, and disclosure could be enjoined without nam- 
ing a member of Congress or congressional aide as a defendant. 
In its brief in AT&T the executive argued: 
Both by its express language and by Supreme Court interpreta- 
tion, the Speech or Debate Clause creates nothing more than an 
immunity of Congress in actions against them. It is not a tool 
that Congress may use to prevent judicial determination of Con- 
stitutional issues. It is a defense to either criminal or civil liabil- 
ity and available only to members of Congress and their aides. 
It cannot be asserted for the benefit of private parties or entities, 
either by those private parties, or by members of Congres~ .~~  
The district court rejected the executive's position: 
The plaintiff has taken the position that this action should 
be considered one seeking solely to restrain a private entity, 
AT&T, from releasing documents in its possession. In this way, 
plaintiff argues, the Court need not consider the applicability of 
the Speech or Debate Clause, since the immunity of that consti- 
tutional provision runs only to members of Congress and their 
subcommittee at oral argument-see note 48 supra. 
56. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 50-51, United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454 
(D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (second opinion). 
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close aides when defending against a lawsuit, and does not af- 
ford any protection to a private entity such as AT&T. This 
argument is advanced so that the Court can avoid dealing with 
a constitutional confrontation between two of the three 
branches of our Government. But to take this avenue would be 
to place form over substance. The effect of any injunction en- 
tered by this Court enjoining the release of materials by AT&T 
to the Subcommittee would have the same effect as if this Court 
were to quash the Subcommittee's subpoena. In this sense the 
action is one against the power of the Subcommittee and should 
be treated as such, assuming that Representative Moss has au- 
thority to speak for the Sub~ommittee.~' 
Neither of the court of appeals' opinions reached the ultimate 
issue on the merits, but the second opinion appears to agree with 
the executive branch on the Eastland issue.58 
Justice Marshall's concurrence in Eastland and the court of 
appeals' opinion in United States v. A T&T notwithstanding, the 
speech or debate protection should not be limited to cases in 
which relief is sought against members of Congress and their 
aides. The reasons for this position can be best appreciated in 
connection with the somewhat comparable problem of the appli- 
cability of executive privilege to information outside the control 
of the government. 
57. 419 F. Supp. a t  458. 
The reach of speech or debate immunity was not dispositive in AT&T. The district 
court held that even though speech or debate is not limited to suits against Congressmen 
or their aides, and even though Eastland imparted to speech or debate a potency that gives 
it absolute powers of infringement on first amendment rights, it does not necessarily follow 
that speech or debate powers are similarly absolute when pitted against the constitution- 
ally based prerogatives of another branch. Id. at 459-61. 
58. The court of appeals' second opinion states: 
The fact that the Executive is not in a position to assert its claim of constitu- 
tional right by refusing to comply with a subpoena does not bar the challenge 
so long as members of the Subcommittee are not, themselves, made defendants 
in a suit to enjoin implementation of the subpoena. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 
513, . . . Justice Marshall concurring. 
567 F.2d at 129. The court went on to say: 
Id. 
In sum, while this case is similar in several respects to the situation in Eastland, 
. . . for purposes of considering whether the Executive's claim is entitled to at 
least some judicial consideration, we emphasize that no member of the Subcom- 
mittee in the present dispute has been made a defendant in a judicial proceed- 
ing. The courts do not accept the concept that Congress' investigatory power is 
absolute. What the cases establish is that the immunity from judicial inquiry 
afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause is personal to members of Congress. 
Where they are not harassed by personal suit against them, the clause cannot 
be invoked to immunize the congressional subpoena from judicial scrutiny. 
a t  130. 
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B. Executive Privilege: Applicability Where the Information 
Is Not in  the Possession of the Government 
One view of executive privilege is that it is a narrowly lim- 
ited, strictly defensive doctrine, applicable only in circumstances 
where the executive branch declines to supply information in its 
possession. On the other hand, executive privilege may be viewed 
as an  affirmative power to prevent disclosure of information 
whose disclosure would be harmful to the interests of government. 
In most circumstances, the difference in the two views is of no . 
practical significance, because the information sought is in the 
executive's possession. This is not always the case, however. In 
order to  carry out certain governmental functions the United 
States must enter into contracts with private companies and 
share with them highly secret information. Probably the most 
common example of this practice is in the manufacture of mili- 
tary equipment, which is frequently accomplished through con- 
tracts with private companies. Pursuant to such contracts, the 
government makes available to the private contractor design 
data, construction details, and other secret information. Another 
example is of course the line-leasing arrangement involved in 
United State v. AT&T which required the executive to share the 
location of its wiretapping activities with the telephone company. 
In these and other contexts, so long as the government elects not 
to go into the business of running the nation's telephone service, 
or building its own national defense hardware, it must enter into 
contractual arrangements with private entities and often share 
highly secret information with them. Is that information-which 
originated from the government, and which would not be in the 
possession of the private entity but for the governmental function 
performed by that entity-subject to executive privilege? 
The limited judicial authority on this question would appear 
to answer it in the affirmative. Although the only case squarely 
on point is United States v. AT&T, and none of the opinions in 
that case discusses the issue, the district court held in favor of the 
executive. Additionally, the court of appeals' second opinion ap- 
pears to rest on the premise that the invocation of executive privi- 
lege is not impeded by the fact that the information is in nongov- 
ernmental possession. And, two earlier cases have implied an 
affirmative executive privilege to restrain third-party disclosures. 
In E. W. Bliss Co. v. United  state^,'^ the Supreme Court 
59. 248 U.S. 37 (1918). 
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affirmed an order enjoining a government contractor "from ex- 
hibiting or communicating the construction and operation of a 
torpedo known as the Bliss-Leavitt torpedo."60 The government 
in the Bliss case was enforcing an explicit contract, but the Su- 
preme Court quoted with approval this observation of the lower 
court: 
Throughout the entire record, in the contracts, correspon- 
dence and dealings of the parties, the importance of secrecy is 
everywhere manifest. The  nature of the services rendered was 
such that secrecy might almost be implied. It  is difficult to 
imagine a nation giving to one of its citizens contracts to manu- 
facture implements necessary to the national defense and per- 
mitting that citizen to disclose the construction of such imple- 
ment  or sell i t  to another nation. The very nature of the service 
makes the construction urged by the defendant ~ntenable .~ '  
Similarly, in United States v. M a r ~ h e t t i , ~ ~  the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld an injunctive order against a former CIA 
official enforcing an agreement not to publish certain information 
concerning the Central Intelligence Agency.63 It would thus ap- 
pear that executive privilege can be used affirmatively to prevent 
the disclosure of sensitive information in the hands of third par- 
ties. 
There are similarities between this issue and the issue dis- 
cussed in Subsection A of this Section, the scope of the speech or 
debate clause as it relates to congressional investigations. In both 
instances the issue is raised in cases where a nongovernmental 
third party is involved: In the speech or debate cases, the private 
party (rather than Congress) is the potential defendant in a suit 
60. Id. at 39. 
61. Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
62. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
63. The court stated: 
[Vhe agency requires its employees as a condition of employment to sign a 
secrecy agreement, and such agreements are entirely appropriate to a program 
in implementation of the congressional direction of secrecy. Marchetti, of 
course, could have refused to sign, but then he would have not been employed, 
and he would not have been given access to the classified information he may 
now want to broadcast. 
Confidentiality inheres in the situation and the relationship of the parties. 
Since information highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and the 
national defense was involved, the law would probably imply a secrecy agree- 
ment had there been no formally expressed agreement, but it certainly lends a 
high degree of reasonableness to the contract in its protection of classified infor- 
mation from unauthorized disclosure. 
Id. a t  1316 (emphasis added). 
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to prevent compliance with the congressional subpoena-the 
bank in Eastland, the telephone company in AT&T. In the execu- 
tive privilege context, the private party (rather than the Presi- 
dent) is the one in possession of the information whose disclosure 
an assertion of executive privilege seeks to prevent. In both set- 
tings the question is whether the doctrines are limited to defen- 
sive uses, relieving the particular branch from the necessity of 
taking action that it views as undesirable, or whether the doc- 
trines can also be used to require action or forbearance on the part 
of someone else. The most important similarity is that in each 
case the fundamental issue is whether the reach of a constitution- 
ally based doctrine central to the operation of one of the branches 
of government should be determined by conceptual considera- 
tions or by the policy on which the doctrine is founded. 
With both speech or debate and executive privilege, the ar- 
guments for a narrow interpretation are largely conceptual. In the 
case of executive privilege, the premise concept is a privilege to 
refrain from divulging information within one's own control. In 
the case of speech or debate, the premise concept is an immunity 
against being joined as a defendant in a lawsuit. On the other 
hand, policy considerations in both cases eschew a restrictive 
view. A basic purpose of executive privilege is to permit the Presi- 
dent to withhold information whose dissemination, in his consid- 
ered view, would be sufficiently detrimental to the public interest 
that such extraordinary action as assertion of executive privilege 
is warranted. Physical possession of the information is irrelevant 
to the considerations that the President takes into account. This 
does not mean that the President can prevent the disclosure of 
any information in the possession of any private person or entity 
upon a determination by him that its disclosure would be detri- 
mental to the national interest. Certainly the President could not 
prevent a private corporation from disclosing information whose 
existence and development were unrelated to government, no 
matter how detrimental to governmental interests the disclosure 
might be. But in cases such as Bliss, Marchetti, and AT&T, the 
information came from the government, the only reason that the 
information is in the possession of the private party is because it 
is essential to the performance by that private party of a govern- 
mental function, and but for the performance of that essential 
governmental function the information would never have been 
supplied. In that kind of case the President should have the same 
power to prevent disclosure as if the information were in the 
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possession of one of his  subordinate^.^^ 
Similar policy considerations apply in delineating the scope 
of the speech or debate clause. The applicability of that constitu- 
tional guarantee to congressional investigations should not turn 
on the fortuity of whether Congress participates in the litigation 
as plaintiff, defendant, or intervenor. While it is true that in 
Eastland the congressional litigants were defendants, it is also 
true that the impact on congressional activity (and therefore on 
speech or debate) will be the same when the executive can pre- 
vent third parties from disclosing, without naming Congress as a 
defendant, as in AT&T. Thus, the district court in AT&T was 
correct in concluding that to draw a distinction between members 
of Congress (or their aides) as defendants and as intervenors 
"would be to place form over s~bs tance ."~~ 
For these policy reasons, the applicability of either executive 
privilege or speech or debate should not be foreclosed in those 
cases where the documents or other information are in the posses- 
sion of a private party or where the congressional entity partici- 
pates in the litigation as plaintiff or intervenor. In considering the 
conflicting interests of the two doctrines, as discussed in Section 
V, the courts should afford a generous interpretation that will 
give full effect to the underlying purpose of each. 
In fact, however, very few executive privilege-congressional 
subpoena cases have reached the courts. One of the reasons is 
that there are significant roadblocks-constitutional and other- 
wise-to each of the avenues by which such disputes can reach 
the courts. Some of the problems attendant upon bringing execu- 
tive privilege-congressional subpoena problems before the courts 
constitute the subject of Sections I11 and IV. 
64. During the early stages of the AT&T litigation, the government relied on an 
agency theory. The complaint squarely alleged that "defendant AT&T has participated 
as an agent of the United States in effectuating certain national security investigations." 
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, a t  16-17. The agency argument was not pursued beyond 
the pleading stage, and the agency analogy is not very helpful. Whether an agency rela- 
tionship exists or not is simply irrelevant to the competing interests on both sides of the 
information disclosure issue. Mr. Marchetti was quite clearly an agent of the CIA and of 
the United States. The Bliss Company, at least for purposes of torpedo manufacture, was 
an agent of the United States. AT&T's agency is more questionable. But the important 
point is that focusing on the agency issue diverts attention away from the relevant issues, 
the involvement of the government in the creation of the information, and whether the 
government as a matter of public interest and constitutional doctrine should be able to 
prevent its disclosure. 
65. 419 F. Supp. a t  458. 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The typical executive privilege-congressional subpoena con- 
flict arises because the executive has determined not to give infor- 
mation to the Congress. The conflict is usually resolved either by 
negotiation or by eventual abandonment of the attempt to obtain 
the information. In a small number of cases, however, a negoti- 
ated settlement will not be possible. Since the executive usually 
has possession of the documents, the next move is up to Congress. 
There are there three procedures available to Congress to imple- 
ment its investigatory objective:" (1) direct punishment for con- 
tempt by the appropriate House of Congress; (2) criminal prose- 
cution by the appropriate United States Attorney under 2 U.S.C. 
5 194; or (3) a civil suit to enforce the subpoena. Each of these 
alternatives presents separate but significant hurdles. 
A. Direct Punishment for Contempt 
Although the Constitution does not expressly confer upon 
Congress the power to punish for contempt," Congress' power to 
do so was early established by Congress itself8 and also by the 
Supreme Court. In Anderson v. Dunn the Court held that to deny 
66. Of course Congress has indirect means available for enforcing its will. It  can cut 
off funds or attempt to impeach the President for failure to respond to its wishes. Even 
an appropriation cutoff, however, is not always successful, as demonstrated by President 
Eisenhower's response to a cutoff of foreign aid funds because the executive failed to reveal 
information. Eisenhower simply instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to disregard the 
cutoff and to draw on federal funds to make the payments. See R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 306 (1974); C. MOLLENHOFF, WASHINGTON COVER-UP 
173-74 (1962). 
67. Article I, 8 5 of the Constitution deals with such internal affairs as the authority 
of each House to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members, the 
constitution of a quorum to do business, compelling the attendance of absent members, 
punishing members for disorderly behavior, expulsion of members, and adjournment; but 
it says nothing about punishment for contempt. 
68. The first attempt by Congress to respond in an official way to contumacious 
conduct occurred in 1795. It  arose out of an alleged bribery of certain members of the 
House by Robert Randall and his chief associate, Charles Whitney. Under authority of a 
warrant signed by the Speaker of the House, Randall and Whitney were arrested and 
appeared before the bar of the House. Their request to be represented by counsel and for 
time to prepare a defense was granted, and the full House considered both direct and 
cross-examination testimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, the House adopted a 
resolution declaring Randall guilty of contempt, resulting in a reprimand by the Speaker 
and commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at Arms. He was finally discharged a week 
later. The Randall-Whitney case is recorded in 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 166-230 (1795). See C. 
BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS 3, 191 app. (1959). A summary of the major contempt cases 
initiated between 1795 and 1943 and a list of all prosecutions from 1944 through 1958 are 
set forth in appendixes A and B of C. BECK, supra. 
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the legislature such powers would lead to "the total annihilation 
of the power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from 
contempts, and [leave] it exposed to every indignity and inter- 
ruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate 
against it."69 The procedure basically involves a resolution by the 
affected House of Congress and the subsequent issuance of a war- 
rant signed by its presiding officer. The alleged contemnor is then 
arrested by the Sergeant a t  Arms. The accused may be repre- 
sented by counsel, and may be given time to prepare a defense. 
The entire House hears the testimony, both direct and cross- 
examination, and then adopts a resolution as to the guilt or inno- 
cence of the accused. If guilt is found, the resolution prescribes 
an appropriate p ~ n i s h m e n t . ~ ~  
Although the constitutionality of the direct contempt pro- 
ceeding appears to be well established, there are several reasons 
why it is not the most appropriate vehicle for the enforcement of 
a congressional inquiry. There is something unseemly about a 
House of Congress getting into the business of trial and punish- 
ment. Congress is simply not geared to the determination of guilt 
or innocence or the meting out of punishment for improper con- 
duct. Though the constitutionality of the direct contempt pro- 
ceeding has been upheld, there is an uncomfortable similarity 
between the direct contempt proceeding and a bill of attainder. 
Both involve the legislative branch in determining whether cer- 
tain conduct should be punished and what punishment is appro- 
priate. It is true that access to the courts is ultimately available 
through a habeas corpus proceeding, but a t  least in the first in- 
stance it is a House of Congress that determines guilt and pre- 
scribes punishment. Moreover, in a case involving an assertion of 
executive privilege the alleged contemnor is usually a prominent 
officer of the executive branch. Use of the direct contempt pro- 
ceeding in that setting might degrade not only the alleged con- 
temnor, but also government in general, including C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~  
69. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821). See also Ex parte Nugent, 
18 F .  Cas. 471 (C.C.D.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375). Nugent had obtained and given to the New 
York Herald a copy of the secret treaty between the United States and Mexico. He was 
called to the bar of the Senate and sworn as a witness, but refused to answer questions 
concerning his publication. Imprisoned on order of the President of the Senate, Nugent 
applied, unsuccessfully, for a writ of habeas corpus. 
70. See C. BECK, supra note 68, at 3-5, 191-95 app. 
71. Some scholars evidently do not feel that this approach should be avoided. 
This, need not be regarded as unseemly or punitive but merely as the mechanism 
that opens the door to judicial review. Once the recalcitrant official is in Con- 
gress' custody he can obtain his freedom by filing a petition with a court for a 
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Finally, the direct contempt proceeding has been virtually re- 
placed by criminal prosecution for contempt. No direct contempt 
proceeding has been brought since 1945.72 
B. Criminal Prosecution for Contempt 
Prior to 1857 the only means for punishing congressional con- 
tempt was the direct contempt procedure. In 1857 Congress es- 
tablished contempt as a statutory crime,73 thus shifting to the 
courts the major responsibility for determining contempt. Over 
the intervening century, the 1857 statute has been modified, but 
its basic provisions have remained the same. The current version, 
2 U.S.C. § 192, provides: 
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by 
the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or 
to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either 
House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concur- 
rent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee 
of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, 
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the 
question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misde- 
meanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less 
than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than 
one month nor more than twelve months.74 
writ of habeas corpus, which poses the issue of Congress' constitutional power 
to insist that the information be supplied. 
R. BERGER, supra note 66, a t  310. But see Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 371, 390 (1976): 
Either course [the direct contempt procedure or statutory prosecution under O 
1941 would be, a t  the least, unedifying, the more so when punishment rather 
than clarification is sought. It would be an attempt by one branch to assert its 
authority by imposing personal sanctions on officials who seek to perform their 
duty for another branch equal to the Congress in its responsibility to serve the 
people. This is neither the level of statesmanship which created our republic, 
nor is it justified by past abuses. Such an attempt would not rectify abuses; it 
would supplant them with new ones. 
The one arguable advantage of the direct contempt procedure is that there are no 
barriers to getting the controversy into court. For reasons set forth in Subsection C, I do 
not regard as salutary the absence of such barriers. The principal disadvantage, discussed 
above, is that it vests in Congress the initial responsibility for determining guilt or inno- 
cence and for imposing punishment. Such functions do not mesh well with congressional 
structure or duties. The congressional role is to make general policy, not to determine 
individual wrongdoing. Congress' organization and institutional mind-set is oriented to- 
ward the achievement of the former, but not the latter. 
72. C. BECK, supra note 68, at 7. 
73. Act of Jan. 24,1857, Ch. 1 9 , l l  Stat. 155 (current version a t  2 U.S.C. 192 (1970)). 
74. 2 U.S.C. 4 192 (1970). 
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Section 192 is a criminal statute. Therefore, in contrast to direct 
contempt procedures, which are the exclusive province of Con- 
gress, implementation of section 192 is the responsibility of the 
executive branch, carried out by enlisting the machinery, of the 
judiciary. Whenever a violation of section 192 is reported to the 
appropriate House of Congress, 2 U.S.C. $ 194 provides that the 
President of the Senate or Speaker of the House is to refer the 
matter "to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty 
i t  shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its ac- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  The establishment of a statutory contempt proceeding 
did not diminish Congress' direct contempt power; it simply pro- 
vided Congress with an alternative means of dealing with con- 
tempts.'" 
Use of the statutory contempt proceeding creates no particu- 
lar separation of powers problem where the alleged contemnor is 
a private party. But it is a different case where the alleged con- 
tempt results from a government officer's refusal to give testi- 
mony or deliver documents on the ground that the information 
sought is subject to an assertion of executive privilege. Referring 
that kind of case to "the appropriate United States attorney," 
who by statute has an unqualified obligation to prosecute, places 
the Attorney General on the horns of a dilemma. One of the horns 
is statutory, the other ethical. The "appropriate United States 
attorney" is an officer of the Justice Department. His file leader 
is the Attorney General. By statute the conduct of litigation in 
which the United States is a party (which would of course include 
section 194 suits) is vested in the Attorney General.77 Therefore, 
the command of section 194 to United States attorneys is also a 
command to the Attorney General. But, ethically, the Attorney 
General may not be able to obey that command. The assertion 
of executive privilege by the President is a weighty and solemn 
matter. Before taking such a step, it is virtually certain that the 
President will have conferred with his chief legal officer, the At- 
torney General; indeed, since 1969 this has been a formal require- 
ment by presidential d i r e c t i ~ e . ~ ~  Having consulted the President 
- -- 
75. Id. § 194. 
76. "[Tlhe purpose of the statute was merely to supplement the power of contempt 
by providing for additional punishment." Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935). 
77. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970). 
78. In 1969 President Nixon issued the following memorandum: 
The policy of this Administration is to comply to the fullest extent possible with 
Congressional requests for information. While the Executive branch has the 
responsibility of withholding certain information the disclosure of which would 
23 11 SEPARATION OF POWERS 257 
about the assertion, the Attorney General could not then ethically 
bring an action against the President or one of the President's 
subordinate officers in connection with a matter on which the 
Attorney General earlier gave his advice as a lawyer.79 
The statute, however, permits no exceptions: the case is cer- 
tified to the United States attorney, "whose duty it shall be to 
bring the matter before the grand jury for its action."80 Utilizing 
the statutory procedure in a n  executive privilege case would 
therefore force the nation's chief legal officer either to refuse to 
obey an unqualified statutory command or to bring a criminal 
prosecution against one whose sole criminal conduct consists of 
obedience to a Presidential order, in connection with which the 
be incompatible with the public interest, this Administration will invoke this 
authority only in the most compelling circumstances and after a rigorous inquiry 
into the actual need for its exercise. For those reasons Executive privilege will 
not be used without specific Presidential approval. The following procedural 
steps will govern the invocation of Executive privilege: 
1. If the head of an Executive department or agency (hereafter re- 
ferred to as "department head") believes that compliance with a re- 
quest for information from a Congressional agency addressed to his 
department or agency raises a substantial question as to  the need for 
invoking Executive privilege, he should consult the Attorney General 
through the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. 
2. If the department head and the Attorney General agree, in accor- 
dance with the policy set forth above, that Executive privilege shall 
not be invoked in the circumstances, the information shall be released 
to the inquiring Congressional agency. 
3. If the department head and the Attorney General agree that the 
circumstances justify the invocation of Executive privilege, or if either 
of them believes that the issue should be submitted to the President, 
the matter shall be transmitted to the Counsel to the President, who 
will advise the department head of the President's decision. 
4. In the event of a Presidential decision to invoke Executive privi- 
lege, the department head should advise the Congressional agency 
that the claim of Executive privilege is being made with the specific 
approval of the President. 
5. Pending a final determination of the matter, the department head 
should request the Congressional agency to hold its demand for the 
information in abeyance until such determination can be made. Care 
shall be taken to indicate that the purpose of this request is to protect 
the privilege pending the determination, and that the request does not 
constitute a claim of privilege. 
R. Nixon, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Estab- 
lishing a Procedure to Govern Compliance with Congressional Demands for Information 
(Mar. 24, 1969). 
79. "A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing 
interests . . . ." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (19%). "No one could 
conscionably contend that the same attorney may represent both the plaintiff and defen- 
dant in an adversary action." Id. n.19 (quoting Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transportation 
Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958)). 
SO. 2 U.S.C. 5 194 (1970). 
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Attorney General was consulted, and whose issuance he probably 
c o ~ n s e l e d . ~ ~  
Referring section 194 cases involving executive privilege to a 
special prosecutor would not solve the problem. A special prose- 
cutor within the executive branch would have some of the same 
ethical problems discussed above. Vesting the enforcement of sec- 
tion 192 in a special prosecutor attached to Congress or the courts 
would raise other serious constitutional questions since the execu- 
tive branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to 
decide whether to prosecute a case.82 
A theoretically possible solution-though not an adequate 
one-might be to establish a special prosecutor with powers anal- 
ogous to those of an independent regulatory agency, appointed by 
the President, but not subject to his removal powers. Currently, 
the conduct of litigation in which the United States is a 
81. The dilemma implicit in statutorily mandating the Attorney General to crimi- 
nally prosecute conduct which he.has advised in his capacity as a governmental lawyer 
arose in 1975 when the problem approached the crisis stage in two cases involving mem- 
bers of the President's Cabinet. 
The first case involved an assertion of executive privilege by Secretary Kissinger. The 
House Select Committee on Intelligence had subpoenaed "[all1 documents relating to 
State Department recommending covert action made to the National Security Council 
and the Forty Committee and its predecessor committees from January 20, 1961, to the 
present." HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF THE SELECT C O M M ~ E  ON 
INTELLIGENCE C ~ N G  HENRY A. KISSINGER, H.R. Doc. No. 693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 
(1975). President Ford asserted executive privilege as to these documents. The House 
Select Committee then recommended that the Speaker certify its report to the United 
States Attorney for the District of Columbia "to the end that Henry A. Kissinger, as 
Secretary of State, may be proceeded against in the manner and form provided by law." 
Id. a t  2. In subsequent briefings the information was supplied to the committee, and as a 
result Chairman Pike reported to  the House that  "substantial compliance has been 
achieved" and by unanimous consent the committee's report recommending contempt 
proceedings was recommitted. 121 CONG. REC. 39730 (1975). 
The second case arose a t  about the same time. On Nov. 11, 1975, the Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Commit- 
tee voted to recommend to the full committee that Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton 
be cited for contempt for refusing to deliver to  the subcommittee documents concerning 
compliance by American companies with the Arab boycott. Secretary Morton's position 
was not based on executive privilege, but was grounded in part on an opinion from the 
Attorney General that the subcommittee was not entitled to receive the reports in question 
unless, in exercising the discretion granted him by 4 7(c) of the Export Administration 
Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(c) (1970), the Secretary determined that withholding them 
would be contrary to the national interest. Once again, crisis was averted through negotia- 
tion, this time on the eve of a full committee vote. See Contempt Proceedings Against 
Secretary of Commerce, Rogers C. B. Morton including Hearings and Related Documents 
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975). 
82. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 454 (1869); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 935 (1965). 
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party-which of course includes criminal litigation-is vested in 
the Attorney General." This could be changed by statute. There 
is at least some question, however, whether a function located as 
close to the core of executive responsibility as enforcement of a 
criminal statute could constitutionally be vested in an entity pos- 
sessing an element of insulation from the executive branch com- 
parable to the independent regulatory agencies. Moreover, as a 
matter of practical policy and politics, it is highly doubtful that 
Congress would create a special prosecutor with such indepen- 
dent powers in order to solve a problem that exists only in theory, 
and has never ripened into an actual prosecution in spite of the 
fact that the statute has been in existence for almost a century 
and a quarter. 
The best solution would be to interpret the mandatory lan- 
guage of section 194 as inapplicable to executive privilege cases 
or any other cases in which the allegedly contumacious conduct 
consists of obedience to legal advice given by the Attorney Gen- 
eral. Although on its face the statutory language permits no such 
exception, and there is nothing in the legislative history to indi- 
cate that Congress thought about this problem, it is certainly not 
an unreasonable interpretation in light of the wrenching effect 
that a literal reading of section 194 would have on separation of 
powers problems and the Attorney General's ethical responsibili- 
ties. The scope of this exception would be limited, and nonappli- 
cability of section 192 within such a limited sphere does not of- 
fend basic notions of fair play. At issue is not the general power 
of the executive branch to punish violations of criminal statutes 
by persons within the executive branch. The Justice Department 
clearly possesses and exercises that power. But when the only 
alleged criminal conduct of the putative defendant consists of 
obedience to an assertion of executive privilege by the President 
from whom the defendant's governmental authority derives, the 
defendant is not really being prosecuted for conduct of his own. 
He is a defendant only because his prosecution is one way of 
bringing before the courts a dispute between the President and 
the Congress. It is neither necessary nor fair to make him the 
pawn in a criminal prosecution in order to achieve judicial resolu- 
tion of an interbranch dispute, a t  least where there is an alterna- 
tive means for vindicating congressional investigative interests 
and for getting the legal issues into court. 
- 
83. 28 U.S.C. 5 516 (1970). 
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There is such an alternative: a civil suit to enforce a congres- 
sional subpoena ordering delivery of the desired information. As- 
suming a continuation of congressional declination to use its di- 
rect contempt powers, this is the only feasible vehicle by which 
conflicts between congressional investigative powers and Presi- 
dential assertions of executive privilege can be resolved. 
C. Civil Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas 
Even though civil enforcement is the preferred route to the 
resolution of executive privilege-congressional subpoena disputes 
(assuming the failure of negotiation), such a procedure also raises 
constitutional questions. Does the initiation of a civil suit by 
Congress constitute a usurpation of the executive's law enforce- 
ment function? Does a federal court have jurisdiction to decide 
the issue? And, assuming that the court has jurisdiction, is the 
issue justiciable? The law enforcement and jurisdiction issues are 
discussed in this Section, while the broader justiciability issue is 
discussed in Section IV. 
1. Congressional suit as law enforcement 
The constitution declares that the President "shall take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed."84 The Supreme Court reaf- 
firmed, in Buckley v. Valeo, that the executive responsibility 
includes bringing litigation to implement federal policy: "A law- 
suit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to 
the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution 
entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faith- 
fully executed.' Art. 11 § 3."" One issue that must be faced, there- 
fore, is whether a civil suit to enforce a congressional subpoena is 
an unconstitutional usurpation of the executive's law enforce- 
ment responsibility. Analogies can be drawn to direct contempt 
proceedings, the constitutionality of which has been upheld. On 
one hand, civil action, unlike direct contempt, requires the filing 
of a lawsuit enlisting the federal judicial machinery in the vindi- 
cation of congressional interests. In this sense civil action involves 
an element of enforcement not present in direct contempt cases. 
On the other hand, while either civil enforcement or direct con- 
tempt proceedings may be used to obtain information, direct con- 
tempt involves the infliction of punishment for offenses against 
84. U.S. CONST. art. 11, Q 3. 
85. 424 US. 1, 138 (1976). 
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a governmental entity. In this respect direct contempt bears a 
closer resemblance to law enforcement than does a civil proceed- 
ing to enforce a subpoena. 
The controlling consideration, however, is that civil enforce- 
ment suits, like direct contempt and unlike bills of attainder or 
law enforcement, generally are brought for the sole purpose of 
vindicating internal congressional prerogatives, not enforcing 
criminal statutes or other laws or policies of the United States. A 
civil proceeding to enforce a subpoena is not a suit "vindicating 
public rights"s6 or implementing official federal policy; seen in 
that light, such a proceeding is not forbidden by the Court's hold- 
ing in Buckley v. Valeo. Additionally, it has been held that a 
Congressman has a right to sue in his representative capacity as 
a Congressman to enforce rights inherent in his position, and from 
this right a congressional power to bring civil enforcement suits 
can be extrapolated. Kennedy v. Sampsons7 held that because of 
his interest in protecting the effectiveness of his vote, Senator 
Kennedy had standing to challenge an attempted "pocket veto" 
of a bill for which he had voted. Similarly, in Mitchell v. Lairds8 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held 
that a Congressman had standing to challenge executive action 
taken in prosecuting the war in Indochina without congressional 
approval. While standing is a separate issue from separation of 
powers, the constitutionality of civil enforcement actions would 
seem to follow a fortiori from the holding in Kennedy and 
Mitchell. In those cases lawsuits were initiated by individual 
members of Congress, and the courts entertained them even 
though they involved vindication of public policy because the 
suits related to the performance of their duties as Congressmen. 
If individual Congressmen can sue, certainly Congress itself can 
authorize a similar remedy, so long as the suit is for vindication 
of interests internal to Congress, and not for enforcement of gen- 
eral national policy.8g 
86. Id. at 140. 
87. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 
(D.D.C. 1976); Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632 
(1977); Comment, Congressional Standing to Challenge Executive Action, 122 U .  PA. L. 
REV. 1366 (1974); Note, Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665 
(1974). 
88. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Cf. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (holding that a Congresswoman did not have 
standing to obtain an injunction against United States participation in military activities 
in or over Cambodia). 
89. The court of appeals in its first AT&T opinion observed: "It is clear that the 
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2. Jurisdiction 
Another impediment to a civil enforcement action is federal 
court jurisdiction to entertain it. The only authority on the sub- 
ject to date is the district court's opinion in Senate Select Com- 
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Ni~on.~O In that 
case Judge Sirica held that such jurisdiction is not supported by 
any general jurisdictional statute. Senate Select Committee was 
a suit by the Senate Select Committee and its chairman, Senator 
Ervin, to compel compliance with two subpoenas: one seeking 
certain tapes, and the other requiring the production of certain 
documents and other materials the committee considered rele- 
vant to its investigation. The plaintiffs "deliberately chose not to 
attempt an adjudication of the matter by resort to a [criminal] 
contempt proceeding . . . or via Congressional common law pow- 
ers which permit the Sergeant at Arms to forcibly secure atten- 
dance of the offending party."Q1 
Four jurisdictional bases were urged by the plaintiffs: 28 
U.S.C. 9 1345" (suits by the United States as plaintiff), 28 U.S.C. 
9 1361g3 (suits in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer of 
the United States to perform his duty), 5 U.S.C. $ 9  701-706Q4 (the 
Administrative Procedure Act), and 28 U.S.C. 9 1331g5 (the 
"federal question" jurisdictional statute). Judge Sirica rejected 
all four grounds: section 1345 because 28 U.S.C. 9 516 "reserves 
to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice authority 
to litigate as United  state^,"^^ the mandamus statute because 
"the Court cannot in good conscience hold that any duty defen- 
dant may have as President is 'plainly defined as preemptory,' " ~ 7  
and the Administrative Procedure Act because "the rule in this 
Circuit precludes use of this Act altogether as an independent 
basis of jurisdiction."" Federal question jurisdiction was unavail- 
able because the case was not "capable of valuation in dollars and 
cents"" and thus failed to satisfy the requirement that the 
House as a whole has standing to assert its investigatory power, and can designate a 
member to act on its behalf." 551 F.2d at 391. 
90. 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973). 
91. Id. at 54. 
92. (1970). 
93. (1970). 
94. (1970). 
95. (1970). 
96. 366 F. Supp. at 56. 
97. Id. at 57. 
98. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted). 
99. Id. at 59. 
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amount in controversy exceed the sum or value of $10,000. Since 
"[nlo jurisdictional statute known to the Court, including the 
four which plaintiffs name[d], warrant[ed] an assumption of 
jurisdiction,"loO the action was dismissed. 
While the appeal in the Senate Select Committee case was 
pending, Congress passed a special statute conferring jurisdiction 
on the District Court for the District of Columbia over any civil 
action brought by the Senate Select Committee "to enforce or 
secure a declaration concerning the validity of any subpoena."lol 
After the new statute took effect, the court of appeals remandedlo2 
the case to the district court which ruled against the committee 
on other grounds.lo3 An appeal was taken only as to the subpoena 
seeking the tapes, but the court of appeals did not reach the 
jurisdictional issue. lo4 . 
The solution to the jurisdictional problem in Senate Select 
Committee may seem to suggest that it would be advisable to 
enact a general statute conferring jurisdiction on federal courts 
over all civil suits to enforce congressional subpoenas.lo5 Disputes 
over congressional subpoenas typically involve issues of 
law-issues that touch on the most fundamental powers of two 
branches of government. Does it not follow that disputes of such 
magnitude should be regularly resolved by the third branch, 
whose powers are not directly at issue and whose core functions 
include interpretation of the laws and the Constitution and the 
resolution of disputes? 
100. Id. at  61. 
101. Act of Dec. 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-190, 87 Stat. 736 (1973). 
102. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 
F.2d 725, 727-28 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
103. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. 
Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ruling on the subpoena request- 
ing the tapes); id. a t  522 n.1 (ruling on the subpoena requesting the documents). 
104. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
105. Indeed, somewhat comparable legislation has been proposed. During the 93d 
Congress, a bill was introduced containing the following provision: 
The District Court for the District of Columbia shall have original, exclusive 
jurisdiction for any civil action brought by either House of Congress, a joint 
committee of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress with 
respect to any claim of executive privilege asserted before either such House or 
any such joint committee or committee. 
Hearings Before the Subcornm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on 
Government Operations and the Subcomms. on Separation of Power and Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 534- 
35 (1973) (S. 2073, § 1364). A companion section of the bill authorized any Senate, House, 
or joint committee to bring suit to contest claims of executive privilege. Id. at  536-37 ( 4  
3103). 
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On balance, I think not. 
There is an observable reluctance on the part of both the 
article I and article I1 branches to submit issues for resolution by 
the third branch that go to the core of their respective constitu- 
tional authority. This may be due in part to interbranch terri- 
torial instincts or to a residual discomfort over some of the impli- 
cations of Marbury v.  Madison.lo6 Whatever the reason for this 
reluctance, the result contributes to good government. Notwith- 
standing the judiciary's final authority in matters of constitution- 
ality, all three branches are concerned with constitutional issues 
which they are called upon to resolve as a regular part of their 
duties. Moreover, it is in the interest of each branch individu- 
ally-and in the interest of the nation as a whole-that disputes 
concerning overlapping or allegedly inconsistent powers conferred 
by article I and article 11 be resolved, if possible, by the branches 
whose powers are implicated. This is not only because negotiated 
settlements are usually more effective than litigation in accom- 
modating the competing interests of both sides,lo7 whether in the 
government or nongovernment context. It is also because there is 
something of an inverse relationship between the effectiveness of 
article 111's heavy artillery for dispute resolution and the fre- 
quency of its use. Particularly in areas involving conflicts over 
interbranch powers, saving the judiciary for the few cases in 
which Congress and the President are absolutely unable to resolve 
their own differences will sharpen the issues that must go to liti- 
gation and will magnify respect for the judicial decision in the 
rare case in which it must be rendered. 
Recognition of the superiority of a negotiated settlement over 
a judicially imposed settlement appears to be an underlying 
premise of the court of appeals' approach in both of its opinions 
in United States v. AT&T. The facts of that case illustrate the 
correctness of the premise. The competing interests of the two 
branches in AT&T were, on the one hand, the need to protect 
foreign intelligence secrets, and on the other, the need for infor- 
mation relevant to possible legislation. The depth and breadth of 
those needs are matters that lie peculiarly within the expertise of 
the executive and legislative branches. The extent to which the 
provisions of a judicial decree might adversely affect these or 
other important governmental interests are also peculiarly within 
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
107. See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371,385-86 
(1976); Comment, United States v. AT&T: Judicially Supervised Negotiation-and Politi- 
cal Questions, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 466 (1977). 
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the ken of the disputants. While the approach taken by the court 
of appeals in AT&T does not mesh nicely with traditional judicial 
forms or procedures, it does combine judicial creativity and flexi- 
bility with the fundamental values of judicial restraint. The por- 
tions of the second opinion dealing with the steps that the district 
court is to take in implementing the court of appeals' decision 
demonstrate the essentially nonjudicial aspects of the task.lo8 The 
skills that this opinion requires of the district court are more the 
skills of the mediator, or even the manager, than the federal 
judge. And yet, just as the court of appeals' approach is charac- 
terized by creativity and flexibility, it also achieves the funda- 
mental values of judicial restraint. There was a dispute between 
parties to a lawsuit. Based upon applicable precedents, the court 
correctly held that it was a justiciable case or controversy under 
article I11 of the Constitution. The court discharged its responsi- 
bility to resolve the controversy by utilizing its judicial power 
only to the minimum extent necessary, leaving the maximum 
opportunity for the parties before it-its sister branches of gov- 
ernment-to apply their own superior knowledge concerning their 
own peculiar needs. This is the essence of judicial restraint. 
Ironically, then, it is not in the interest of good government 
to make it easier for two coordinate branches to have differences 
over their respective constitutional powers readily resolved by the 
third. Accordingly, enactment of a statute generally conferring 
federal court jurisdiction over the enforcement of congressional 
subpoenas would not be in the public interest. Such disputes are 
best resolved by ad hoc enactment of narrow jurisdictional stat- 
utes such as the Senate Watergate Committee obtained. Direct 
punishment should be left in its present dormant state, and 2 
U.S.C. 8 194 should be used only for non-executive-privilege cases 
which do not confront the Attorney General with the dilemma 
discussed above. With the only avenue for judicial relief in execu- 
tive privilege-congressional subpoena confrontations requiring an 
act of Congress, the pressure on both sides1OQ to reach a negotiated 
settlement will be just about right-not insuperable, as the Sen- 
ate Watergate Committee experience shows, but nevertheless suf- 
ficient to provide real incentive. 
The preferability of negotiation over adjudication as a means 
108. 567 F.2d at 131-32. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
109. In one sense, the "pressures" are greater on Congress, because the disputed 
information is in the possession of the executive branch. It is Congress, however, that can 
elect judicial resolution as an alternative to a negotiated settlement by enacting a jurisdic- 
tional statute. 
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of settling interbranch disputes is also fundamental to the issues 
of the justiciability of such disputes. These issues are the subject 
of Section IV of this Article. 
IV. JUSTICIABILITY OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- CONGRESSIONAL 
SUBPOENA CONFLICTS 
Whether a conflict between a President's exercise of execu- 
tive privilege and a congressional assertion of investigative power 
is a justiciable "case or controversy"110 that the federal courts are 
authorized by article 111 to adjudicate depends principally on 
whether such an issue is a "political question." In 1958, when the 
reach of the political qbestion doctrine was far broader than it is 
today, no lesser an authority than Judge Learned Hand expressed 
the view that such a dispute between two branches of government 
was a clear example of a nonjusticiable constitutional question.lll 
The leading case dealing with the political question issue, 
Baker v. Carr, 112 contains a general statement that "it is the rela- 
tionship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship 
to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.' "113 Judi- 
cial accommodation of the doctrines of executive privilege and 
congressional subpoena power fits rather neatly within the 
Court's general description, "the relationship between the judici- 
ary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government." 
Necessarily, however, any time the federal courts are called upon 
to determine the scope of the constitutional authority of a coordi- 
nate branch, "the relationship between the judiciary and the co- 
ordinate branches of the Federal Government" is involved. On 
several occasions over the past half century, the Court has been 
required to make decisions having the effect of allocating author- 
ity between the legislative and executive branches. A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States114 and Panama Refining 
110. See U.S. CONST. art. III, 4 2, cl. 1. In earlier years a dispute between Congress 
and the executive might have been thrown out of court on the grounds that the same 
party-the United States-cannot be both plaintiff and defendant. The Gray Jacket, 72 
U.S. (5 Wall.) 342, 371 (1866) (Treasury Department could not ordinarily oppose the 
Attorney General). In recent years, however, the courts have entertained intergovern- 
mental suits. See, e.g., United States ex re1 Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 
153 (1953); ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944). See also R. BERGER, supra note 66, a t  
313-20. 
11 1. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15-18 (1962). 
112. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection challenges to  legislative ap- 
portionment were justiciable). 
113. Id. a t  210. 
114. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
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Co. u. Ryan115 involved allocations of constitutional power be- 
tween the Congress and the President where there was no dispute 
between the branches. Buckley u. Valeo, llVoungstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. u. Sawyer,l17 United States u. Louett,"* Humphrey's 
Executor u. United States,llQ and Meyers u. United States120 all 
involved, in one form or another, issues of allocation of authority 
between Congress and the President that the third branch was 
called upon to resolve. These are the clearest kinds of cases in- 
volving "the relationship between the judiciary and the coordi- 
nate branches of the Federal Government." 
Baker v. Carr also described some of the characteristics 
"[plrominent on the surface of any case held to involve a politi- 
cal question."121 They are, 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility 
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without ex- 
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern- 
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a po- 
litical decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass- 
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart- 
ments on one question.122 
The "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
-- -- - 
powers portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President to 
approve "codes of fair competition"). 
115. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down the "Petroleum Code" of the National In- 
dustrial Recovery Act as excessive delegation of legislative powers to the executive). 
116. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that Congress may not appoint federal executive 
officers, in this case, members of a federal elections commission; the power to appoint 
officers of the United States is an article II executive power and the Constitution prohibits 
Congress from performing that function). 
117. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating a Presidential order nationalizing the steel 
industry as a usurpation of the lawmaking authority of Congress). 
118. 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (invalidating as a bill of attainder a provision of an appropri- 
ation bill requiring that no funds could be used to compensate three named government 
employees). 
119. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that Congress could limit the President's power to 
remove members of the Federal Trade Commission, an independent regulatory agency). 
120. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that Congress could not constitutionally prohibit the 
President from removing executive officers). 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), another prominent political question case, 
dealt solely with the issue of congressional power asserted with respect to internal congres- 
sional affairs, and did not implicate the powers of the executive branch. 
121. 369 U.S. a t  217. 
122. Id. 
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for resolving" the issue and the "impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion" would appear particularly descriptive of executive 
privilege-congressional subpoena confrontations. In the few in- 
stances in which federal courts have faced such issues, however, 
they have decided them. A conflict between a congressional sub- 
poena and a Presidential assertion of executive privilege was in- 
volved in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon. 123 Neither the court of appeals nor the district 
court opinions in that case discussed justiciability, but both 
courts reached the merits. Necessarily, therefore, both held the 
case j~sticiab1e.l~~ 
Although the Senate Select Committee decisions were ren- 
dered prior to Eastland's very deferential treatment of congres- 
sional activities,121 the same conflict between executive privilege 
and congressional investigations was involved in United States v.  
AT&T and, in that case, both courts held it justiciable. The court 
of appeals dealt at length with the justiciability issue in its second 
opinion. The court first noted that the Constitution did not com- 
mit the resolution of the issue to either branch.126 It then rejected 
both the executive's claim that the "Constitution confers on the 
executive absolute discretion in the area of national security"127 
and Congress' claim that the speech or debate clause prevented 
judicial interference with its a ~ t i 0 n s . l ~ ~  As to the question whether 
the court should abstain for lack of "judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards," the court concluded that negotiations 
- 
123. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This appeal involved only the subpoena seeking 
disclosure of certain tape recordings. No appeal was taken from the district court's earlier 
order quashing a subpoena seeking certain records and documents. See notes 102-04 and 
accompanying text supra. 
124. Judge Wilkey took the position that the case presented a nonjusticiable political 
question; however, because that conclusion was foreclosed by the court's earlier holding 
in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973)' he concurred in the court's opinion. 498 F.2d at 
734 (Wilkey, J., concurring). 
125. See notes 44-58 and accompanying text supra. 
126. 567 F.2d at  126. 
127. Id. at 128. The court noted that the Constitution confers powers related to 
national security upon both the President and Congress, and that "the question of alloca- 
tion of powers associated with foreign affairs and national security" falls within a "zone 
of twilight" in which the President and Congress share authority. Id. 
128. Id. at 128-29. In refuting Congress' claim that the speech or debate clause immu- 
nized congressional action from judicial interference, the court relied upon Senate Select 
Committee and the Eastland Court's observation that in prior cases the Court had bal- 
anced congressional investigatory powers against first amendment rights. Id. at 129. See 
note 51 supra. 
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between the parties had "largely obviated this problem by bring- 
ing into sharper focus the needs of the parties."ln 
The Court in United States u. Nixon observed in connection 
with the justiciability argument in that case that "[iJn the Con- 
stitutional sense, controversy means more than disagreement and 
conflict; rather it means the kind of controversy courts tradition- 
ally resolve. " 130 If "the kind of controversy courts traditionally 
resolve" means historic judicial practice and not just frequency 
of occurrence, it would seem quite clear that United States v. 
Nixon also supports the view that article 111 authorizes judicial 
resolution of disputes concerning allocation of authority between 
the article I and the article I1 branches.131 The instances in which 
such disputes have reached the courts have been rare. But when 
they have, the courts historically have resolved them, as illus- 
trated by the cases discussed above. 
The controversy in Nixon was between two officials of the 
executive branch. Other things being equal, the case for justicia- 
bility of an intrabranch dispute is harder than that of a dispute 
between coordinate branches of government. Most of the criteria 
prescribed by Baker v. Carr-including particularly "the impos- 
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion" and "the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question"lJ2-are clearly more pronounced 
when the dispute involves only a single branch. Disagreements 
between two executive departments or two committees of Con- 
gress would seem clearly nonjusticiable under the Baker v. Carr 
guidelines and under the dictates of common sense. In an intra- 
branch dispute there is a final, nonjudicial authority over the 
disputants (the President or the congressional leadership) and 
the controversy should be resolved within the branch in which it 
arises. Even so, United States v. Nixon and Powell u. 
129. 567 F.2d at 127. 
130. 418 U S .  at 696. 
131. Professor Archibald Cox takes a different view as to the meaning of this phrase: 
But the Chief Justice probably meant to limit these sentences by the preceding 
sentence which points out that the evidence whose production is sought and 
resisted is "deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in 
a pending criminal case"-an element that satisfied the need for the "kind of 
controversy courts traditionally resolve." 
Cox, Executive Rivilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1423-24 (1974) (emphasis in original) 
(footnote omitted). 
132. 369 U.S. at 217. 
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M c C o r m a ~ k ~ ~ ~  were both intrabranch controversies that were held 
justiciable. In those cases, however, the concept of an intrabranch 
final authority was inapplicable because the President in Nixon 
and the congressional leadership in McCormack were parties to 
the disputes. Moreover, there is serious question whether United 
States u. Nixon would have been justiciable absent the regulation 
delegating authority "to represent the United States in these par- 
ticular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and 
tenure ."ls4 
Professor Cox argues that "[tlhe absence of a material pri- 
vate stake in the outcome may prove . . . important"ls5 to the 
justiciability issue. He points out that in Schechter Poultry, Pan- 
ama Refining, Meyers, Humphrey's Executor, Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube, and Louett "[elach of the . . . cases was brought by or 
against a state or a private person who had a material stake in 
the outcome."136 By contrast, he points out, "[tlhe named par- 
ties in an action to enforce a subpoena against a claim of execu- 
tive privilege might be the Congress or a congressional body and 
the President."ls7 It is probably true that there will be some kind 
of private stake in the outcome in most cases (other than execu- 
tive privilege-congressional subpoena conflicts) wherein the un- 
derlying issue concerns the distribution of power between two 
branches of government. This was true in Powell u. McCormack, 
as well as in the cases cited by Professor Cox. It was technically 
true in United States u. AT&T, though the interest of the tele- 
phone company in that case was only a formal one.ls8 But, the 
presence of a private stake in the outcome of interbranch disputes 
should have no bearing on justiciability. No more important 
questions come before federal courts than how the Constitution 
distributes power among the branches of government. The com- 
133. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
134. 418 U.S. at 694 (footnote omitted). 
135. Cox, supra note 131, a t  1423. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Professor Cox seems to argue that even in United States v. Nixon there was 
something like a private controversy. Id. at  1423-24. He finds significant the language of 
the opinion describing the evidence at  issue as "deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be 
relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case." 418 U.S. a t  697. In my view, the 
interest of the special prosecutor did not impart to United States v. Nixon "a material 
private stake in the outcome." However his peculiar relation to the executive branch is 
defined, the special prosecutor was clearly an officer of government and an officer of the 
executive branch. He was performing functions that no one outside the executive branch 
could constitutionally perform. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976). And his interest 
in the litigation rested exclusively on his official governmental responsibilities. 
2311 SEPARATION OF POWERS 271 
parative magnitude of the relevant governmental interests do not 
vary in the slightest according to whether some private party also 
has a stake in the outcome. Therefore, the existence or nonexis- 
tence of private interests should be irrelevant to the justiciability 
question. 
A characteristic of executive privilege-congressional sub- 
poena cases that arguably cuts against justiciability is that with- 
holding judicial relief will not result in failure of resolution. The 
case will usually be resolved by the President's deciding to com- 
ply or not comply with the subpoena. While the President is an 
elected officer and is presumed to act in the public interest, this 
approach is not at all satisfactory because it commits the resolu- 
tion of the dispute to one of the disputants.13Q Moreover, where, 
as in AT&T, the documents at issue are in the possession of a 
private corporation, a holding of nonjusticiability shifts the effec- 
tive decisional authority, not to a governmental entity, but to a 
corporation which has neither an interest in the dispute nor any 
reason to have considered-much less weighed-the competing 
governmental values. 
There is another characteristic-unique to executive 
privilege-congressional subpoena cases-which, taken alone, 
makes the case for justiciability of such disputes more difficult 
than in other instances where the judiciary is called upon to re- 
solve competing claims to constitutional authority by its sister 
branches. For reasons discussed in Section V below, the prefera- 
ble method for judicial resolution of executive privilege- 
congressional investigation conflicts is to have the courts balance 
the competing interests without creating a presumption in favor 
of either. Admittedly, that kind of balancing will significantly 
involve the federal courts in reexamining underlying policy 
choices in substantive areas quite clearly committed to one or 
both of the other branches of government. It is, however, the 
alternative that is most consistent, both in theory and in applica- 
tion, with underlying separation of powers precepts. In this re- 
spect, the issue of justiciability is closely linked to the final issue 
139. The court of appeals in its second AT&T opinion stated: 
Where the dispute consists of a clash of authority between two branches, how- 
ever, judicial abstention does not lead to orderly resolution of the dispute. No 
one branch is identified as having final authority in the area of concern. If the 
negotiation fails-as in a case where one party, because of chance circumstance, 
has no need to compromise-a stalemate will result, with the possibility of 
detrimental effect on the smooth functioning of government. 
567 F.2d at 126. 
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to be discussed by this Article: If federal courts are constitution- 
ally empowered to resolve confrontations between assertions of 
executive privilege and exercise of congressional investigatory 
powers, by what standards should they perform that task? The 
final discussion of justiciability will therefore be deferred and 
considered in connection with the issue of appropriate judicial 
standards. 
One approach to constitutional law is to divide the entire 
field into two broad components. The first deals with the powers 
of government, state or federal, and the second with the protec- 
tion of individual interests against the exercise of those govern- 
mental powers. The lines separating the two are not always rigid. 
The diffusion of power and authority among the three branches, 
as well as between the national and state governments, helps to 
assure against arbitrary infringement of individual rights by less- 
ening the concentration of power in any one group, and by setting 
off some governmental entities as checks and balances against the 
powers of others. 
This view of constitutional law as divisible into two broad 
categories is helpful in determining the proper standards by 
which federal courts should decide cases involving conflicts be- 
tween executive privilege and congressional investigations. Such 
conflicts fall within the realm of the first category of constitu- 
tional law, the powers of government. Determination of the pro- 
per standards for resolution of these conflicts, however, is aided 
by examination of the judicial struggles and the results of those 
struggles in connection with the second category, the protection 
of individual interests against the exercise of governmental pow- 
ers. 
In attempting to achieve a constitutional accommodation of 
governmental-societal and individual interests, the courts have 
used a single overarching approach. That approach has been to 
balance in some fashion the competing sets of interests-those of 
the individual, and those of society (as determined by society's 
elected legislative representatives). Not all of the opinions de- 
scribe their approach as involving balancing, and in most cases 
the balancing has not been evenhanded in the sense that the 
inquiry is usually not whether the interests on the one side or the 
other preponderate. Rather, the courts generally inquire into 
whether the interests on one side are sufficient to overcome a 
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predetermined weighting favoring the other. But it is a balanc- 
ing approach in the sense that the conflicting interests of the 
individual and society are reconciled by taking into account in 
some fashion the comparative strengths of those conflicting inter- 
ests in each particular case. Indeed, the only alternative to some 
kind of balance between governmental and individual interests is 
an absolutist, per se approach, which would prescribe that in 
certain contexts either the legislative decision will always be 
honored or the constitutionally recognized individual rights will 
always be protected. While the absolutist approach has been ad- 
vocated in cases involving individual versus societal interests,140 
it has rarely if ever been followed. 
The question has not been whether to balance, but how. 
Some of the most important issues over the long range of our 
experience with constitutional adjudication have concerned the 
weighting of the balance scales either in favor of the individual 
or the government. This weighting is not that which results from 
a consideration of the merits of the individual case, but rather 
that which occurs before the court reaches the merits for all cases 
of that kind, so that in the particular case one side or the other 
will have more than a fifty-fifty burden to overcome. 
In areas where there have been a substantial number of cases 
involving a conflict between governmental and individual inter- 
ests-including the first amendment, equal protection, due pro- 
cess, and the commerce clause-this pre-merits weighting has 
occurred. Some of the most important developments in American 
constitutional history have centered on whether the weighting 
should favor government or the individual. In determining the 
constitutionality of state-imposed burdens on interstate com- 
merce resulting from exercises of the police power, the balance 
scales were at  one time weighted heavily in favor of the legislative 
judgment.141 The weighting probably still favors state govern- 
ment, though not as much as before.'" In cases involving the first 
140. Its most vigorous advocates in recent years have been Justices Black and Doug- 
las, who have argued for such an approach in favor of government in commerce clause 
cases, see, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 789 (1945) (Black, J., dissent- 
ing); id. a t  795 (Douglas, J., dissenting); J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND 
LOCAL TAXATION, 250-51 (4th ed. 1978), and in favor of the individual in first amendment 
cases, see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U S .  36,64-74 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); 
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867, 875-81 (1960). See also Branden- 
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). On the general issue 
of the absolutist versus the balancing approach see L. T R ~ E ,  AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 582-84 (1978). 
141. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
142. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959): "These safety 
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amendment and other "fundamental" rights, the pre-merits 
weighting favors the individual.lh3 In substantive due process 
cases, individual interests, both economic and noneconomic, were 
given a heavy preference for many years.144 At least as to economic 
matters this has now been reversed, and the judicially imposed 
weighting favors the g~vernment;"~ indeed, the opinions in some 
cases even suggest an absolutist standard.146 As to certain non- 
economic matters, the eradication of the earlier substantive due 
process approach is less clear.14' In equal protection cases the 
general rule has been for many years,'" and still is,'" that the 
state may distinquish among persons or classes so long as the 
distinction is not irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate 
state objective. Two exceptions have been rather firmly estab- 
lished, however. If either (1) the classification itself falls into a 
"suspect" category,150 or (2) the individual interest affected is 
" f ~ n d a m e n t a l , " ~ ~ ~  the weighting is reversed and the balance 
scale, prior to consideration of the merits of the individual case, 
is tipped in favor of the individual. Thus, the consistent judicial 
approach to cases constituting one of the two broad components 
of constitutional law-the accommodation of individual and gov- 
measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court." Southern Pac. 
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,770 (1945): "There has thus been left to the states wide scope 
for the regulation of matters of local state concern, even though it in some measure affects 
the commerce." 
143. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
144. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 
(1897). 
145. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
146. Fergusson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,731 (1963): "Unquestionably, there are argu- 
ments showing that the business of debt adjusting has social utility, but such arguments 
are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U.S. 483, 487 (1955): "The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in 
many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of the new requirement." 
147. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Gris- 
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U S .  479 (1965). See also Constitutional Law Symposium: Allo- 
cation of Policymaking Authority Between Court and Legislature, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
37. 
148. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot 
Comm'rs, 330 US.  552 (1947). 
149. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976). 
150. The categories which have been defined as "suspect" include race, alienage, and 
national origin. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). But see Foley v. 
Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978) (holding that limiting state police appointments to U.S. 
citizens does not violate equal protection rights of aliens). 
151. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). 
23 11 SEPARATION OF POWERS 275 
ernmental interests-has been to balance and to identify in ad- 
vance of the balance which set of interests is to be preferred. 
In those cases involving conflicts between governmental in- 
terests and individual interests, there are sound theoretical and 
practical reasons for pre-merits weighting of the balance scales. 
The practical reason is that cases calling for a choice between 
competing interests are easier to decide if the court is called upon, 
not to decide which of the two is in fact heavier, but whether one 
is sufficiently heavy to overcome a predetermined handicap. The 
theoretical support for a pre-merits weighting of governmental- 
versus-individual-interests cases is that the competing interests 
are of different quality and come from readily distinguishable 
sources. With the governmental set of interests being rooted in a 
legislative judgment and the individual set of interests in the 
Constitution, good arguments can be made for preferring either. 
The basic argument for weighting the scale in the individ- 
ual's favor is that his position is based on the Constitution and 
is therefore entitled to greater weight than his opponent's com- 
peting claim based on a statute. As Hamilton observed in No. 78 
of The Federalist, "If there should happen to be an irreconcilable 
variance between [the Constitution and a statute] that which 
has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be 
preferred; or in other words, the Constitution ought to be pre- 
ferred to the statute."lJ2 This familiar statement is probably the 
best contemporary support for the argument that judicial review 
was contemplated by the original Constitution-makers. Its under- 
lying and undisputed premise-the superiority of the Constitu- 
tion over legislative acts-also provides a theoretical basis for a 
general pre-merits weighting in favor of individual interests. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the legislature 
should have the scales tipped in its favor, since the competing 
considerations underlying all legislative judgments involve issues 
of public policy. The accommodation of competing policy inter- 
ests is the single most important responsibility of legislative bod- 
ies. Legislators, like judges, are sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
and to the extent constitutional issues are involved, these will be 
taken into account by the legislators in making the final choices 
among policy alternatives. Therefore, the argument runs, though 
legislators' decisions should not be immune from judicial review, 
their judgments should be given deference. 
For present purposes, the important point is not which of 
152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 492 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). 
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these positions is more persuasive, or whether what the court has 
in fact done-giving the preference to the state in some contexts 
and to the individual in others-is in accord with sound constitu- 
tional principles. The important point is that there is a sound 
theoretical basis for giving a preference either way, and good 
practical reasons for doing so. 
There is a difference between this kind of case and executive 
privilege-congressional subpoena cases, however. Executive 
privilege-congressional subpoena cases involve questions of the 
constitutional allocation of power among coequal branches of the 
federal government, rather than protection of constitutionally 
based individual interests against the exercise of governmental 
powers. The conflict in first amendment, fourteenth amendment, 
and commerce clause cases is between governmental and nongov- 
ernmental parties. The claim of one is based on the Constitution, 
and the other on the judgment of the legislature in matters of 
public policy choice. By contrast, in executive privilege- 
congressional subpoena cases, the conflicting interests are rooted 
in the same source and are of the same general type. The dispute 
is between two of three coordinate branches of the federal govern- 
ment, each of which bases its claim on a grant of power contained 
in the United States Constitution. 
In selecting the appropriate standard for deciding executive 
privilege-congressional subpoena conflicts, the courts have three 
basic choices. They are: 
(1.) An absolute, per se rule, under which the interests of one 
of the branches will always prevail, regardless of the comparative 
strengths of the parties' positions in the case. 
(2.) A balancing approach similar to that employed in the 
governmental interests versus individual interests context, as- 
signing a predetermined preference either to congressional sub- 
poena power or executive privilege. 
(3.) A true, evenhanded balance, weighing the impact of al- 
ternative outcomes on the underlying objectives of both executive 
privilege and congressional investigations without any pre-merits 
weighting. 
These three alternatives for judicial resolution of executive 
privilege-congressional subpoena cases will now be considered, 
including, as to each, an examination of its supporting authority 
and the theoretical and practical implications of its adoption. 
These alternatives assume that the substance of the controversy 
is to be resolved by the courts. The alternative of resolution by 
another branch (by hypothesis one of the parties to the dispute), 
the policy and constitutional issues posed by that alternative, 
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and its similarities to the absolutist approach will also be consid- 
ered in connection with the examination of the alternative stan- 
dards. 
A. The Absolutist Standard 
There are three basic arguments favoring adoption of an ab- 
solutist approach. The first is that it is simple to apply. Second, 
it yields consistent, predictable results with consequent planning 
benefits to government and nongovernment individuals and insti- 
tutions. The third argument is similar to the position that execu- 
tive privilege-congressional subpoena cases are not justiciable: 
either of the other approaches necessarily involves the judiciary 
to some degree in a reexamination of the underlying policy con- 
siderations made by one or both of the other branches in issuing 
the subpoena or asserting executive privilege. These are matters 
that are not only "committ[ed] . . . to a coordinate political 
department,"153 they lie a t  the very core of the responsibilities of 
the other branches. 
The strongest support for vesting final decisional authority 
in the Congress comes from Professor Cox, who would vest that 
authority in either House of Congress that considers the matter. 
Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit have advocated that the President 
should have that authority. 
I .  Professor Cox and absolute deference to Congress 
In the subsection of his article on executive privilege entitled 
"Modern Need to Invest the Court With Enforcement Jurisdic- 
tion," Professor Cox reviews three developments that in his view 
"furnish persuasive evidence of a need to increase the power of 
Congress to compel the President and others in the executive 
branch to produce information."ls4 He then proposes the follow- 
ing: 
These trends probably make it desirable to put the force of 
law behind some congressional subpoenas addressed to the Pres- 
ident, his aides or other executive officials. Ideally, I think, the 
legislative right should prevail in every case in which either the 
Senate or House of Representatives votes to override the Execu- 
tive's objections, provided that the information is relevant to a 
153. Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. at 217. 
154. Cox, supra note 131, at 1432. 
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matter which is under inquiry and within the jurisdiction of the 
body issuing the subpoena, including its constitutional jurisdic- 
tion. A single committee or subcommittee, because it offers lit- 
tle guaranty of restraint, is the greatest threat to the values of 
confidentiality and carries the great danger of oppression. The 
very need for a vote of an entire chamber would not only provide 
a forum in which the Executive's arguments could be fairly 
considered, but the uncertainty of the outcome would press all 
concerned to negotiate a resolution. A vote of the entire Senate 
or House of Representatives is required to cite a private person 
for contempt. The requirement has proved useful in the past. If 
either House did vote to require the information, the President 
should have no constitutional right to withhold it and the Judi- 
ciary should not go behind the voted demand except to decide 
questions of relevance and jurisdiction. This would avoid the 
difficulty of developing nonpolitical, judicial standards of deci- 
sion and thus would meet the chief constitutional objection to 
other legislative pr0posa1s.l~~ 
Under Professor Cox's proposal, the judicial role would be 
limited to deciding the threshold questions of relevance and juris- 
diction. Any issues concerning the conflicting policy demands of 
the legislative and executive branches would presumably be left 
to the final decision of the particular House of Congress, as would 
the persuasiveness of the executive's arguments, which are to be 
"fairly considered." 
2. Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey and absolute deference to the 
President 
The positions of Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey are set forth 
in separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part 
from the en banc per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit in Nixon v. Sirica. 15@ At issue in 
Nixon v. Sirica was an order entered by District Judge Sirica to 
enforce a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directing President 
Nixon to produce certain tapes and documents. The legality of 
Judge Sirica's order was challenged by both the President and 
also the special prosecutor, then Mr. Archibald Cox. Because of 
serious questions concerning its jurisdiction to consider the spe- 
cial prosecutor's petition under the "all writs" statute,15' the 
155. Id. at 1434. See also P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1978). 
156. 487 F.2d 700, 729-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, dis- 
senting in part); id. at 762-99 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
157. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue 
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court exercised its discretion to consider only the President's peti- 
tion.lJ8 
Having asserted executive privilege with regard to the items 
sought by the grand jury, President Nixon's counsel contended, 
inter alia, "that Executive privilege is absolute with respect to 
presidential communications, so that disclosure is a t  the sole dis- 
cretion of the President."lJg The majority rejected the President's 
argument that the privilege is absolute, observing that through- 
out history "there have frequently been conflicts between inde- 
pendent organs of the federal government"lW and that "[wlhen 
such conflicts arise in justiciable cases, our constitutional system 
provides a means for resolving them-one Supreme Court."lM In 
response to the contention that the President's position was sus- 
tained by the doctrine of separation of powers, the court re- 
sponded that "[tlo leave the proper scope and application of 
Executive privilege to the President's sole discretion would repre- 
sent a mixing, rather than a separation of Executive and Judicial 
 function^."^^^ 
In place of absolute deference, the majority applied a 
weighted balancing test, discussed further in Subsection B, with 
the pre-merits presumption favoring the executive. The court 
observed that "such conversations are presumptively privi- 
leged"lu but held that the presumption "must fail in the face of 
the uniquely powerful showing made by the Special Prosecutor in 
this case."lB4 
Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey wrote separate opinions and 
each concurred in the other's opinion. Judge MacKinnon's opin- 
ion contains a lengthy and scholarly review of the history of Presi- 
dential assertions of executive privilege and an analysis of some 
of the relevant Supreme Court opinions, from which he concludes 
there is a sound basis for "an absolute, evidentiary privilege for 
conversations and deliberations of the President with his close 
advisors," and further that "the privilege also has constitutional 
dimensions. "Ia5 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. 4 1651(a) (1970). 
158. 487 F.2d at 706-08. 
159. Id. at 708. 
160. Id. at 715. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 717. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 750 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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In Judge Wilkey's view, the issue in the case was as follows: 
The Per Curiam here never confronts the fundamental Con- 
stitutional question of separation of powers, but instead prefers 
to treat the case as if all were involved was a weighing and 
balancing of conflicting public interests. There are conflicting 
public interests involved, they must be carefully weighed, bal- 
anced, and appraised; the President says he has done just that. 
Therefore, the most fundamental, necessarily decisive issue is, 
Who Does [sic] the weighing and balancing of conflicting pub- 
lic interests? The District Judge or the President? The answer 
to this question necessarily involves the Constitutional question 
of separation of powers.166 
Addressing the issue "Who decides?" Judge Wilkey concluded: 
I thus reach the conclusion, differing from the majority of 
my colleagues, that the privilege asserted by the President here 
derives both from the Constitutional principle of separation of 
powers and from the common sense-common law, statutory 
privilege of confidentiality of Governmental decision-making, 
whatever the Branch. The latter may be subject to weighing and 
balancing of conflicting public interests, as many of the cases 
have done, but never in a case involving the President as a 
party. But where the privilege of the Chief Executive is derived 
from the Constitutional principle of separation of powers, it is 
no more subject to weighing and balancing than any other Con- 
stitutional privilege can be weighed and balanced by extra- 
neous third parties. 
Every President, beginning with Washington and Jefferson, 
has asserted that the privilege and the scope and applicability 
are for him alone to decide. This is precisely what Congress does 
when it either grants or withholds documents in response to the 
request of a court for evidence in a criminal case. This is what 
no doubt this court would do if confronted with a demand by a 
Congressional committee for any of our internal documents. We 
would weigh and decide and assert the privilege as we saw it, 
not as a Congressional committee would see it. W e  would do so 
on the Constitutional ground of separation of powers. And this 
is what the President has done here.lB7 
Nixon u. Sirica did not involve a conflict between executive 
privilege interests and congressional investigative interests. 
While there was no confrontation of executive and legislative 
branch prerogatives, there was a straight confrontation between 
166. Id. at 763 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
167. Id. at 773-74 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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the judiciary and the executive.168 Thus, Judges MacKinnon and 
Wilkey contended for absolute deference to the Presidential judg- 
ment in asserting executive privilege against the judiciary. There 
is no reason to conclude they would take any other position vis- 
a-vis Congress. Moreover, in his concurring opinion in Senate 
Select Commit tee  on  Presidential Campaign Activit ies v. 
Nixon, la which involved a confrontation between congressional 
investigative power and executive privilege, Judge Wilkey re- 
ferred to his opinion in Ninon v. Sirica as taking the position that 
actions challenging Presidential assertions of executive privilege 
are nonjusticiable. 170 
The positions taken by advocates of the absolutist approach 
demonstrate the close linkage between the issues of justiciability 
and the substantive standards by which courts should resolve the 
dispute. If the judicial decision on the merits runs in favor of the 
executive, then in the majority of cases the net effect will be the 
same as if the court held either that (1) the case is not justiciable, 
or (2) even though justiciable the courts should withhold judicial 
relief as a matter of prudence. In the typical executive privilege- 
congressional subpoena case it is Congress that needs affirmative 
judicial action because the executive has possession of the docu- 
ments. If the courts do not act, that possession remains unaf- 
fected, and the executive wins. The result is the same if the courts 
decide the case, but defer absolutely to the executive. Thus, it 
should not be surprising that the opinions of the two principal 
advocates of absolute deference to the executive judgment, 
Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey, do not sharply distinguish be- 
tween issues of justiciability and substantive standards for deci- 
sion. Rather, they concentrate on the propriety-as a matter of 
history, policy, and good constitutional adjudication-of leaving 
the final judgment to the President. Similarly, while Professor 
Cox's view is that ultimate resolution should be left to a full vote 
of the appropriate House of Congress, it is not clear whether his 
position is (1) that Congress should pass a statute authorizing 
such a procedure, and the courts should hold the statute constitu- 
tional; (2) that absent such a statute, courts should hold that  
since another branch of government is better suited to resolve 
168. The tapes were to be examined in camera by the district judge "and the grand 
jury may never see or hear any of them after the District Judge's review in camera. " Id. 
at 788. As a consequence, "the Judiciary-Executive confrontation is there at the outset, 
whatever the character of the grand jury." Id. 
169. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
170. Id. at 734 (Wilkey, J., concurring). 
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such disputes the courts will refrain from decision and will if 
necessary enforce the judgment of the House of Congress when 
made; or (3) that if a House of Congress has passed on the issue, 
courts should refrain from taking any action. As in the case of the 
positions taken by Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey, any of these 
views results in shifting the real decisional authority from the 
courts to another branch of government.171 
B. Weighted Balancing 
Three federal judicial opinions have considered on the merits 
square conflicts between a Presidential assertion of executive 
privilege and a congressional subpoena. They are the district 
court's and court of appeals' opinions in Senate Select Committee 
on Presidential Campaign Activities v .  Nixon, and the district 
court opinion in United States v .  A T ~ c T . ' ~ ~  At least two of the 
three opinions (and perhaps all three) have applied a weighted 
balancing standard, with the pre-merits weighting favoring the 
President. This is the only approach, therefore, that is clearly 
supported by a majority opinion of a federal court. 
The Senate Select Committee case was a suit by the Ervin 
committee seeking access to five tape recordings of conversations 
between President Nixon and John Dean. The committee had 
served a subpoena duces tecum on the President, who responded 
by asserting executive privilege. On the first go-around of at- 
tempted judicial enforcement, Judge Sirica ruled that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction. Congress thereupon passed a special 
statute giving the district court jurisdiction to enforce the select 
committee's subpoenas.174 In the subsequent enforcement action 
the district court (Judge Gesell) dismissed the complaint without 
prejudice. Whether he gave any pre-merits weight to the assertion 
of executive privilege is not clear from the opinion. On the one 
hand, the opinion made the observation that "[ilt has not been 
demonstrated to the Court's satisfaction that the Committee has 
a pressing need for the subpoenaed tapes or that further public 
hearings before the Committee concerning the content of those 
171. If shifted to a House of Congress, this will mean that the legislative branch wins. 
There may, however, be some occasions when a House of Congress would decide to deny 
to one of its constituent committees the information requested from the executive branch, 
but this would rarely occur. 
172. The district court opinion is reported at 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1974) and the 
court of appeals opinion at 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
173. 41.9.F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opin- 
ion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion). 
174. See text accompanying note 101 supra. 
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tapes will at this time serve the public interest."175 On the other 
hand, the concluding paragraph stated that "while the contro- 
versy presented is justiciable, the Select Committee has not es- 
tablished by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled 
at this particular time to an injunction directing the President to 
comply with its subpoena for the five tape recordings."17s 
By contrast, the court of appeals in the Senate Select 
Committee case quite clearly followed a weighted balancing ap- 
proach. That court held applicable the same basic approach that 
it had followed in Nixon u. Sirica: a generalized assertion of exec- 
utive privilege by the President is "presumptively privileged,"17' 
and the presumption can be overcome "only by a strong showing 
of need by another institution of government-a showing that the 
responsibilities of that institution cannot responsibly be fulfilled 
without access [to the documents sought]."178 Thus, the court of 
appeals in Senate Select Committee ( 1 )  adopted as the governing 
rule a weighted balancing approach with the presumption favor- 
ing the Presidential assertion of privilege in cases involving con- 
flicts between congressional subpoenas and assertions of execu- 
tive privilege based on confidential communications; (2) relied as 
precedent on its earlier ruling in Nixon v .  Sirica, thus suggesting 
that the same standard is applicable whether the Presidential 
assertion conflicts with fundamental functions of either of the 
other branches; and (3) rejected the district court's opinion inso- 
far as it followed a contrary approach.17g By the time the case 
reached the court of appeals, the House Committee on the Judici- 
ary had begun its inquiry into Presidential impeachment. Under 
these circumstances, the court held that "the Select Committee 
has failed to make the requisite showing"i80 because its 
"immediate oversight need for the subpoenaed tapes is, from a 
congressional perspective, merely cumulative." lgi With regard to 
the weight of the burden, the court observed that the committee 
had not shown that "the subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably 
- - - 
175. 370 F. Supp. at 522 (emphasis added). 
176. Id. at 524 (emphasis added). 
177. 498 F.2d at 730. 
178. Id. 
179. The "apparent understanding" of the district court opinion which the court of 
appeals rejected was probably the district court's failure to weight the scales in the Presi- 
dent's favor. Id. 
180. Id. at 731. 
181. Id. at 732. With regard to congressional oversight, the opinion observed, "In the 
circumstances of this case, we need neither deny that the Congress may have, quite apart 
from its legislative responsibilities, a general oversight power, nor explore what the lawful 
reach of that power might be under the Committee's constituent resolution." Id. 
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critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's func- 
tions."lU2 
The court of appeals opinion in Senate Select Committee v. 
Nixon was issued just about a year before the Supreme Court held 
in Eastland u. United States Servicemen's Fund that the issu- 
ance and enforcement of congressional subpoenas are included 
within the speech or debate clause immunity. United States v. 
AT&T is the only post-Eastland case to consider on the merits a 
square conflict between executive privilege and congressional 
subpoena power. The magnitude of the conflict was sharpened by 
the fact that the asserted executive interest was the protection of 
foreign intelligence secrets, an area of Presidential responsibility 
in which the United States Supreme Court declared in United 
States v. Nixon that "courts have traditionally shown the utmost 
deference." lm Moreover, the congressional interest in A T&T was 
enforcement of a subpoena, held by Eastland to be included 
within speech or debate, and the Eastland opinion had declared 
that "the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause are abso- 
1ute."lR4 
While the formal parties in United States v. AT&T were the 
United States (the executive branch) as plaintiff and AT&T as 
defendant, the telephone company had no interest in the outcome 
of the suit, filed no pleadings, and neither briefed nor argued any 
of the issues. The position adverse to that of the President was 
vigorously advanced by the intervenor and the real party in inter- 
est, Chairman Moss, who initially appeared on behalf of himself, 
and later on behalf of the entire House of Representatives. Chair- 
man Moss took the absolutist position that the judicial inquiry 
should end with a determination that the subpoena was issued for 
a legitimate legislative purpose. The district court rejected this 
view and stated that the appropriate test was to balance the 
competing interests: 
The Court accepts the position of the intervenor that the 
subpoenaed materials are sought pursuant to a legitimate legis- 
lative investigation. Contrary to the intervenor's argument, 
however, the Court's inquiry cannot conclude a t  this point. The 
legislative authority to investigate is not absolute. In our system 
of government the Constitution is supreme, but no one portion 
of the Constitution is sacrosanct. Here, the nature, the extent 
182. Id. at 731. 
183. 418.U.S. at 710. 
184. 421 U.S. at 501. 
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and the relative importance of the power of one coordinate 
branch of government must be balanced against that of the 
other. Neither can be considered in a vacuum.185 
The district court listed three factors it felt should appropri- 
ately be taken into account in affecting the balance: (1) "whether 
the information requested is essential to 'the responsible fulfill- 
ment of the committee's functions,' Senate Select Committee v. 
Nixon, . . . 498 F.2d 725, 731 (1974)"; (2) "whether there is 'an 
available alternative' which might provide the required informa- 
tion 'without forcing a showdown on the claim of privilege,' 
United States u. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 . . . (1953)"; and (3) 
"the circumstances surrounding and the basis for the Presidential 
assertion of privilege. [United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. a t  
111; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 . . . (1974)."lM 
As to the first two factors, the court commented that "[tlhe 
helpfulness of the national security request letters in determining 
the basis on which the wiretaps were instituted is minimal."ls7 
However, the backup memoranda, even though subject to dele- 
tion of specific information, would "ostensibly afford the Sub- 
committee relevant information upon which to determine 
whether the wiretaps were instituted for foreign intelligence sur- 
veillance rather than domestic surveillance and to make the de- 
termination as to whether new legislation should be drawn."ls8 
With regard to the third factor, the court observed: 
[Tlhe President has determined that release of the material 
would present an unacceptable risk of disclosure of the most 
sensitive national security and foreign policy matters. The pos- 
sible effect of such disclosure has been detailed above. Such a 
determination by the Executive is generally accorded great 
deference by the courts.189 
The court's final conclusion was as follows: 
[Ilf a final determination as to the need to maintain the secrecy 
of this material, or as to what constitutes an acceptable risk of 
disclosure, must be made, it should be made by the constituent 
branch of government to which the primary role in these areas 
185. 419 F. Supp. at 459. 
186. Id. at 460. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974); United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Chicago & S.  Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
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is entrusted. In the areas of national security and foreign policy, 
that role is given to the Executi~e.'~o 
The same considerations discussed above as supporting an 
absolutist approach also support the position that if the court is 
to balance the interests of one branch against those of another, 
pre-merits weighting is better than a straight balancing. It is 
easier, it yields more consistent and predictable results, and it 
requires lesser judicial involvement in policy matters clearly com- 
mitted to another branch. Weighted balancing also has the sup- 
port of the limited judicial precedents dealing with the issue. The 
conceded materiality of these considerations notwithstanding, 
they are insufficient to carry the day. They bear more heavily on 
justiciability and on the wisdom of the court of appeals' efforts 
in the AT&T and Nixon v. Sirica cases to achieve a negotiated 
settlement than on the standards for judicial decision. 
I believe that the preferred approach is an evenhanded bal- 
ancing with no pre-merits weighting. Unlike the other two ap- 
proaches, it has been advocated by neither judicial nor scholarly 
opinion. Some of the reasons why it is the best approach are 
closely linked to the issue of justiciability. Accordingly, the final 
Subsection of this Article will discuss my views concerning justi- 
ciability (discussed earlier in Section IV) and nonweighted bal- 
ancing as the appropriate standard for judicial resolution of exec- 
utive privilege-congressional subpoena cases. 
C. Justiciability and Nonweighted Balancing 
I .  Justiciability 
All three opinions that have resolved on their merits conflicts 
between executive privilege and the congressional subpoena 
power-the district court and the court of appeals in Senate Se- 
lect Commit  tee and the district court in A T&T-have necessarily 
held that such conflicts are justiciable. The court of appeals' 
second opinion in AT&T also held such disputes justiciable, thus 
providing the basis for its creative attempts to achieve a negoti- 
ated solution, if possible, and for its ultimate disposition of the 
merits of the case, if necessary. 
190. Id. at 461. This case demonstrates that the three standards suggested 
above-absolute deference, weighted balancing, and straight balancing-may shade into 
each other. Judge Gasch's final paragraph, quoted above, suggested that in carrying out 
his stated purpose to balance the competing considerations he may have weighted the 
scales so heavily in the executive's favor that the end result was absolute deference to the 
President's decision, the approach advocated by Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon. 
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The arguments against justiciability, discussed in Section IV 
above, highlight the problems that  result from judicial attempts 
to resolve confrontations between executive privilege and con- 
gressional investigative power. If the appropriate judicial stan- 
dard is to balance without a pre-merits weighting, judicial resolu- 
tion will not only involve consideration of matters that are 
"committ[ed] . . . to a coordinate political department;"lgl in 
the usual case courts will be required to reevaluate the policy 
judgments reached by the other branches. Moreover, in the usual 
executive privilege-congressional subpoena case, these policy 
judgments are not only central to the other branches' constitu- 
tional duties; they are also judgments that the other branches are 
much more qualified to make. 
What this counsels, however, is not that executive privilege- 
congressional subpoena cases are nonjusticiable, but rather that 
courts should follow the lead of the court of appeals in AT&T: 
decline to reach the merits in such suits until all reasonable ef- 
forts to bring about a negotiated settlement have been exhausted. 
Manifestly, the parties understand better than the courts which 
aspects of their positions can be compromised without working 
serious damage to their own particular needs and to important 
governmental objectives. Moreover, because of the case or contro- 
versy limitation on judicial fact finding, courts lack the fine- 
tuning capability to achieve through judicial decree a resolution 
that would serve the competing interests as well as would a nego- 
tiated compromise. It is therefore consistent with article 111's case 
or controversy limitation, as well as with basic separation of pow- 
ers principles, for courts to afford the parties to interbranch dis- 
putes every reasonable opportunity to achieve-and sometimes 
pressure them toward achieving-a compromise, prior to and as 
a precondition of judicial resolution. 
I t  must be recognized, however, that even the most creative 
judicial efforts to maximize the opportunity and the incentive for 
a negotiated settlement will not always bear fruit. While it is in 
the interest of good government to have the disputant branches 
resolve their own differences if they can, it is not in the interest 
of good government to leave the dispute unresolved. Indeed, leav- 
ing such disputes "unresolved" does not really leave them unre- 
solved. A holding of nonjusticiability means victory for the defen- 
dant; in most executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases 
this will be the President. The conflict in these cases is real and 
191. Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. a t  217. 
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the stakes are high; the relevant issues are central to governmen- 
tal functions. Such issues deserve consideration on the merits 
rather than decision by default. I t  is unthinkable, for example, 
that the dispute in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyerlg2-a 
pure vanilla dispute over the respective powers of Congress and 
the President-should have been left unresolved. 
It is therefore necessary that there be a final decisional au- 
thority. Such authority should-and does-rest with the courts. 
The issues in interbranch controversies concern the interpreta- 
tion of the Constitution for the purpose of settling disputes be- 
tween disagreeing parties. Both the resolution of disputes and the 
declaration of constitutional doctrine are the traditional province 
of the judiciary. And whatever the difficulties or potential impro- 
prieties posed by the federal judiciary's attempting to resolve 
such disputes and fashion an appropriate remedy, they are cer- 
tainly no greater than in legislative apportionment or busing 
cases. Judicial resolution of interbranch disputes should be a last 
resort. But in those rare cases where judicial resolution is neces- 
sary, decision of such cases on the merits is not only consistent 
with the case or controversy limitation of article 111, it is the most 
important thing federal courts do. 
2. Nonweighted balancing: the preferred judicial approach 
Just  as courts should avoid deciding executive privilege- 
congressional subpoena cases as long as there is any reasonable 
possibility that judicial efforts to induce a negotiated settlement 
may be successful, a court faced with the necessity of deciding 
such cases should apply a rule of decision that recognizes the 
equality of its sister branches of government who are the litigants 
in its courtroom. The standard that achieves maximum fidelity 
to this objective is a straight balance with no pre-merits weight- 
ing given to either side. 
As discussed above, an absolutist standard would be the easi- 
est to apply and would yield the most consistent and predictable 
results. But it is a standard that places the judiciary in the posi- 
tion of having to decide which of its sister branches is to receive 
such automatic and inflexible favor at  the expense of the other. 
That kind of judicial decision is unseemly, unwise, and inconsis- 
tent with sound separation of powers theory. A fundamental 
premise of separation of powers theory is that even though each 
branch enjoys spheres of activity within which it is supreme, in 
- - - 
192. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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their interbranch relationships and in the status to which each is 
entitled before other branches, all are equal. This is especially 
true when the position of each branch in a litigated interbranch 
dispute is solidly grounded on settled constitutional principles. 
An absolute, never-changing preference of one of these positions 
over the other regardless of the circumstances of the individual 
case is inconsistent with the premise that each branch is equal 
in its relationships with other branches. 
Based perhaps on notions of separation of powers, there is a 
decided and understandable judicial reluctance to reexamine a 
policy judgment made by a coordinate branch within its own 
particular sphere of responsibility. For example, in support of his 
"Who decides?" approach in Nixon v. Sirica (and his conclusion 
that the one who decides is the President), Judge Wilkey reasons, 
"There are conflicting public interests involved, they must be 
carefully weighed, balanced, and appraised; the President says he 
has done just that."lg3 Judge Wilkey's conclusion is: 
Thus, the real issue, even by the analysis in other parts of 
the Per Curiam opinion, is whether it is appropriate for the court 
to determine the legal validity of a claim of privilege by the 
President, or whether the Constitutional principle of separation 
of powers requires the court to yield to the President's judgment 
as to where the public interest lies. My answer would be the 
latter. lB4 
The final paragraph of District Judge Gasch's opinion in 
United States v .  AT&T states the same basic approach: 
The Court is not implying that the members of the Sub- 
committee, or of the House of Representatives, will act negli- 
193. 487 F.2d 700,763 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
The foregoing analysis assumes, for reasons set forth and discussed in text accompanying 
notes 168-70 supra, that Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon would apply the same rationale 
as contained in their Nixon v .  Sirica opinions to a controversy involving conflicting prerog- 
atives of the legislative and executive branches. In any event, the analysis set forth above 
is also applicable to the dispute in Nixon v. Sirica, since the conflict there was between 
the powers of the executive and judicial branches. Arguably, the hardest case for justicia- 
bility of interbranch conflicts and for the application of a nonweighted balancing approach 
occurs in those cases where one of the branches involved in the interbranch conflict is the 
judiciary. In such cases, the courts act, in a sense, as judges of their own case. Notwith- 
standing this conceptual concern, the conclusions reached in the text are equally applica- 
ble where judicial powers are in conflict with those of another branch. The underlying 
premise of the "rule of necessity," Evans v. Gore, 253 U S .  245, 247-48 (1920); Atkins v. 
United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1040 (Ct. C1. 1977), is that when there is no other alterna- 
tive, judicial decision of cases in which the judiciary may have an institutional interest 
poses lesser net drawbacks than leaving important issues, particularly constitutional is- 
sues, unresolved. 
194. 487 F.2d at  794 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
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gently or in bad faith if they have access to these documents. 
But it does appear to the Court that if a final determination as 
to the need to maintain the secrecy of this material, or as to 
what constitutes an acceptable risk of disclosure must be made, 
it should be made by the constituent branch of government to 
which the primary role of these areas is entrusted. In areas of 
national security and foreign policy, that role is given to the 
Executive. lg5 
This reluctance to reevaluate the policy judgments of an- 
other branch is appropriate in the vast majority of contexts. In- 
deed, on many issues within areas of exclusive executive or legis- 
lative responsibility, the judicial standard ought to be nothing 
less than absolute deference.lg6 But that kind of approach breaks 
down where the interests on both sides of the conflict are sup- 
ported by policy determinations made by officials of two separate 
branches of government, each acting in his own particular sphere 
of governmental responsibility. Judge Wilkey is right: The Presi- 
dent has balanced the competing national interest considera- 
tions. He has done so in the exercise of his constitutional responsi- 
bilities, and he has reached a final conclusion. If the President 
were the only governmental entity and if his decision were the 
only public policy judgment involved in the litigation, then abso- 
lute deference or something approaching it would be the appro- 
priate standard. But where the litigated interests in conflict with 
those of the President are also supported by a policy judgment 
made by a coequal branch of government, the supporting ration- 
ale for absolute deference is missing and the absolutist approach 
is inappropriate. 
Professor Cox's position that "the legislative right should 
prevail in every case in which either the s inate  or the House of 
Representatives votes to override the Executive's objections"lg7 
suffers from the same defect. His assurance that "[tlhe very 
need for a vote of an entire chamber would . . . provide a forum 
in which the Executive's arguments could be fairly considered"1g8 
might or might not be realized in any given case. A fair forum 
notwithstanding, vesting the final decisional authority over dis- 
putes between the Congress and the President with either of the 
195. 419 F. Supp. at 461. 
196. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Banco Na- 
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
197. Cox, supra note 131, at 1434. 
198. Id. 
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disputants is still fundamentally unfair and the unfairness strikes 
at the very roots of coequality and separation of powers. 
The district court in AT&T concluded 
that if a final determination as to the need to maintain the 
secrecy of this material, or as to what constitutes an acceptable 
risk of disclosure, must be made, it should be made by the 
constituent branch of government to which the primary role [in 
the areas of national security and foreign policy] is entrusted.lgg 
There is a parallel, equally persuasive article I-based position 
that if a final decision as to the need of these materials for legiti- 
mate legislative purposes-and the ability of a subcommittee to 
adequately safeguard them-must be made, it should be made by 
the constituent branch of government to which the primary re- 
sponsibility for policymaking is entrusted.200 Thus, litigation in- 
volving interbranch conflicts places the court in a genuine theo- 
retical dilemma. Choosing between the conflicting positions of 
sister branches and reviewing the substance of policy decisions 
made by those branches are not the kinds of functions that courts 
perform best. But the alternatives are even worse: adopting the 
absolutist approach and thus yielding automatically in every case 
to the judgment of one branch and rejecting that of the other; or 
simply staying out of the matter, which necessarily results in a 
de facto holding in favor of one branch or the other. 
A weighted balancing approach is also inappropriate for the 
resolution of executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases. 
When the competing interests requiring judicial resolution are 
those of society on one hand and the individual on the other, there 
are both practical and theoretical reasons for giving a preference 
to one set of interests.201 There is no adequate basis for such a 
distinction, however, when the competing interests are those of 
199. 419 F. Supp. at 461. 
200. Indeed Chairman Moss took just such a position. His first brief before the court 
of appeals states: 
The plain mandate of existing judicial authority . . . makes clear that the 
responsibility of courts in a case such as this is limited to a determination of 
whether Congress is acting within its jurisdiction, as opposed to usurping powers 
exclusively vested elsewhere. Conversely, those authorities make abundantly 
clear that, having made such determination, the principle of separation of pow- 
ers precludes the courts from substituting their judgment for that of Congress 
as to the specific need for particular information that Congress seeks in a course 
of a valid legislative investigation. 
Brief for Intervenor-Appellant a t  49-50, United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion). 
201. See text following note 151 supra. 
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coordinate branches of government and when both sets of inter- 
ests are rooted in the Constitution. 
While there are other possible arguments for preferring one 
set of interests over another, they fall short of justifying a pre- 
merits weighting in favor of either the legislature or the executive. 
In favor of Congress it might be asserted that congressional inves- 
tigative powers fall under the speech or debate immunityM2 which 
is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution while executive privi- 
lege is only implied. Although a true statement, it is unpersuasive 
for several reasons. First, even though the Constitution expressly 
provides for speech or debate immunity, it does not expressly 
extend such immunity to the issuance and enforcement of con- 
gressional subpoenas. Second, the Court has not traditionally 
assigned a higher constitutional value to express rights and prin- 
ciples than to implicit ones and is not likely to do so. The premier 
power and function of the federal courts, judicial review, is im- 
plicit rather than express. Some of the individual rights that the 
Court has held to be "fundamental," such as the right to travelzo3 
and various aspects of the right of privacy,204 must be inferred 
from more explicit provisions. 
For the executive, i t  might be argued that a decision by the 
President, in whom all article I1 authority is vested, does not 
really stand on the same footing as a decision by a single commit- 
tee of one House of Congress (or in some cases, a single subcom- 
mittee or subcommittee chairman, vested with authority to issue 
subpoenas). This argument also is insufficiently persuasive. The 
functioning of each branch within itself and the level of approval 
that must be obtained before official action is to be taken are 
matters internal to that branch, as long as the requirements of 
the Constitution are met. Even if one were to assume that the 
Constitution requires such symmetry that the decision of a Presi- 
dent is under all circumstances to be preferred to that of a con- 
gressional committee or subcommittee, the needs of such concep- 
tual symmetry would be satisfied by the fact that the reason 
subpoenas ccn be approved by the action of a committee, sub- 
committee, or a chairman is that the entire House of Congress has 
arranged its internal structure to permit such a procedure. 
Finally then, these two postulates remain: (1) Each branch 
enjoys primary responsibility and authority over certain govern- 
202. See notes 44-58 and accompanying text supra. 
203. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
204. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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mental functions (lawmaking, law enforcement, and law interpre- 
tation, including judicial review). Nevertheless, in their inter- 
branch relationships, in the deference that each branch owes to 
the other two, and in the standing that each enjoys before the 
others, the three branches are equal. (2) It is fundamentally in- 
consistent with that principle of coequality for the judiciary to 
resolve cases or controversies involving competing constitution- 
ally based claims of the other two branches by according absolute 
deference to the judgment of either. I t  is equally inconsistent with 
coequality for the courts to hold such a case nonjusticiable 
(thereby effecting the same net result as absolute deference) or 
to employ a balancing approach that weights the balance scales 
in favor of one branch or the other. 
Thus, the remaining alternative is a genuine balancing ap- 
proach without any predetermined preference for either side, with 
the victor to be determined on the basis of a simple preponder- 
ance of relevant considerations. This approach will be the most 
difficult of all possible judicial approaches and will provide the 
least predictable results. Since executive privilege-congressional 
subpoena controversies so rarely call for judicial resolution, how- 
ever, and since the governmental stakes involved are so large, 
judicial ease and predictability do not seem as important as in 
other contexts. 
Whenever an executive privilege-congressional subpoena 
case comes before a court, both parties will have already made 
certain judgments and reached certain conclusions. In the AT&T 
case, for example, the subcommittee had determined that access 
to the leased line letters was necessary to the subcommittee's 
oversight function and to enable i t  to determine whether amend- 
ments to the Communications Act should be enacted. On the 
other side of the balance scale was the President's determination 
that compliance with the subpoena would involve unacceptable 
risks of disclosure. In attempting to achieve a balance between 
these two competing determinations, there are several levels of 
possible judicial reevaluation of underlying policy judgments, 
and concomitantly, judicial intrusion into substantive policy 
areas committed to other branches. 
The first level, involving the least judicial intrusion, would 
be for the court to acceptthe correctness of the judgments made 
by each of its sister branches and-taking these judgments as 
correct-balance the one against the other. Because it involves 
less judicial intrusion into the affairs of the other branches, this 
would be the preferable approach, provided that it would satis- 
factorily resolve the case. I suspect that in many executive 
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privilege-congressional subpoena cases, however, i t  will not. 
Applying such an approach to the facts of the AT&T case, it 
might be contended that the President's determination has a 
broad sweep involving detriment "to the national defense and 
foreign policy of the United States and damag[e] to the national 
security." Accepting this determination a t  full value, it has a 
greater impact on national interests than the oversight of one 
subcommittee and consideration of the possible need to amend 
section 605 of the Communications Act. This is an unduly formal- 
istic kind of analysis, however, and would simply invite broader 
congressional definitions of the legislative investigative purpose. 
In AT&T, for example, the purpose of the investigation could 
have been described as a determination of the extent to which the 
United States government is infringing upon the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of its own citizens. This could have been cou- 
pled with a legislative determination that access to the docu- 
ments was indispensable to the achievement of the legislative 
objective. Thus, taking the policy judgments of the respective 
branches totally a t  face value as articulated by Congress or the 
President and attempting to balance them may be a futile exer- 
cise. 
The level of judicial inquiry a t  the opposite extreme would 
involve the court in a complete redetermination of the policy 
judgments made by the other two branches. In the AT&T case, 
reexamination of the underlying legislative policy judgments 
would have involved such inquiries as, "Why is this information 
really important to the legislative inquiry?" or "What kind of 
legislation does the subcommittee have in mind, and how do 
these documents bear on that legislation?" A more extreme in- 
quiry-which I assume no court would ever make-would be, 
"Are any amendments to section 605 really necessary?" On the 
Presidential side, a reevaluating court might ask what the "risks 
of disclosure" really are, and why they are "unacceptable." Nei- 
ther Mr. Moss nor anyone on the subcommittee ever indicated an 
intent to disclose anything in the subpoenaed documents. Indeed, 
the subcommittee pointed to its own excellent record in main- 
taining the security of secret information. On what, then, does the 
President base his judgment that there are risks of disclosure and 
that they are unacceptable? This kind of reevaluation of Presi- 
dential decisions could lead the court into other areas which most 
courts would quite clearly want to avoid and which in most cases 
they should avoid. But, in some cases, certain such questions 
might be appropriate for in camera review, such as: What do the 
documents really contain? And, why is it that their disclosure 
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(assuming that there are risks of disclosure) would be detrimental 
to national interests?2o5 
In most cases, total judicial abstinence from substantive ex- 
amination of the competing determinations of the other branches 
would provide an insufficient basis for deciding the case, but 
complete judicial reevaluation of those judgments would involve 
more judicial intrusion than is necessary. There is an intermedi- 
ate level of judicial inquiry that I believe in most cases will enable 
the court to satisfactorily perform its constitutional duty to de- 
cide cases or controversies, without unduly intruding into the 
constitutional domain of the other branches. In most-possibly 
all-executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases the court 
could accept as its premise the correctness of the competing pol- 
icy judgments made by the Congress and the President. I t  could 
then focus on possible alternatives to the withholding or disclo- 
sure of the information a t  issue, and in the process determine 
which alternatives would serve the policy objectives of one of the 
branches without significantly diminishing those of the other. 
The AT&T case is again illustrative. The President deter- 
mined that compliance with the subpoena would involve unac- 
ceptable risks of disclosure. Without reexamining that judgment, 
are there alternative means for protecting against the risks of 
disclosure, other than total withholding? Would it be possible to 
limit the examination of the documents to a secure place pro- 
vided by the executive branch, or to limit the number of legisla- 
tive branch personnel who will make the examination and who 
205. There are persons whose general orientation opposes exposure of secret material 
to persons outside the executive branch. Certainly, it is in the interest of government and 
its citizens to limit the number of persons, no matter how reliable, who have access to 
secret information. But, there is no magical linkage between executive branch employ- 
ment and reliability with regard to secret information. For reasons set forth below, it  is 
preferable for courts applying a balancing test to executive privilege-congressional sub- 
poena cases to do so at a level that will involve the least possible intrusion into underlying 
policy judgments of sister branches, so long as such intrusion minimization can be 
achieved without sacrificing the court's ability satisfactorily to decide the case. The 
subjective impression born of my personal experience is that courts generally are very 
cautious about examining government secrets, and that when such examination has been 
necessary, the judicial security record is a t  least as good as that of either of the other 
branches. It is true that federal judges have not signed-as executive branch personnel 
have-a written undertaking not to disclose, and it  would be unseemly to ask them to do 
so. But they have taken an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. In those few cases 
where it may be necessary for a court to conduct a limited in camera investigation of secret 
material, including material of the sensitivity involved in the AT&T case, such an exami- 
nation should be made. The reason that executive branch personnel have access to such 
information is that it is necessary to the performance of the governmental responsibilities. 
There are circumstances under which the same would be true with the federal judge. In 
such a case, the court should make the examination. 
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will have access to the results of that study? On the legislative 
side, the subcommittee determined that the information con- 
tained in the leased line letters is essential to the performance of 
its legislative duties of oversight and possible statutory revision. 
Accepting the correctness of that determination, are there means 
of supplying the information other than providing access to the 
leased line letters? Are there other documents whose delivery to 
the subcommittee (accepting also a t  face value the President's 
determination concerning risks of disclosure) would pose lesser 
risks, but would be just as helpful or even more helpful to the 
committee? 
The foregoing questions certainly do not exhaust the alterna- 
tives in AT&T, and any executive privilege-congressional sub- 
poena case will present its own unique set of alternative solutions. 
What these examples illustrate is that in AT&T the consideration 
of alternatives would permit the court to apply a nonweighted 
balancing approach at a level that would minimize substantive 
reexamination of the underlying policy judgments made by its 
sister branches. This should be true in most executive privilege- 
congressional subpoena cases. The ultimate issue in those cases 
will always be whether information should be delivered to Con- 
gress, where a component of Congress has decided that it should 
be delivered and the President has decided that it should not. 
Thus, just as in AT&T and in the Senate Select Committee case 
(where the court of appeals considered alternatives to the infor- 
mation sought by the committee and ultimately based its deci- 
sion on the existence of such alternatives), any executive 
privilege-congressional subpoena case should present opportuni- 
ties for consideration of alternative solutions. The consideration 
of alternatives does not completely extricate courts from the busi- 
ness of policy reevaluation, but at the very least, it shifts the 
reevaluation to a less intrusive level. In AT&T, consideration of 
alternatives could be undertaken without disturbing either the 
Presidential judgments concerning the disclosure risks, or the 
congressiona! judgments concerning the need for information. 
In other contexts, consideration of alternatives has been 
found relevant to the resolution of constitutional issues.206 In exec- 
utive privilege-congressional subpoena cases, such an approach 
would permit the courts to balance the competing governmental 
206. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); United 
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U S .  349 (1951). 
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interests, but with minimal reevaluation of the policy judgments 
made by other branches. It would therefore seem to be the ap- 
proach that best satisfies the judicial responsibility to decide 
cases or controversies without undue intrusion into functions that 
are equally central to constitutional duties of the other two 
branches. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The germs of executive privilege and congressional investiga- 
tory powers were contained in the 1787 Constitution. Neverthe- 
less, principles for dealing with the interactions between these 
two doctrines have only recently begun to emerge. 
Probably the least satisfactory judicial approach to the ac- 
commodation of the competing needs of these two constitutional 
doctrines would be to hold the issue nonjusticiable. Such an ap- 
proach would in fact resolve the conflict on a general, all- 
encompassing basis, without any opportunity for taking into ac- 
count the particular characteristics of the individual case. 
It is important that courts resolve these or any other conflicts 
between Congress and the President in a way that not only de- 
cides the case, but also recognizes the equality of the article I and 
article II branches as they appear before the article 111 branch. 
The only approach that is faithful to this objective is a straight 
balance of the competing interests, with no pre-merits weighting. 
For this reason it is the preferred approach, even though to date 
no court has applied it, and no judge or scholar has advocated it. 
